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Congress created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in the
wake of the Great Recession to foresee, prevent, and mitigate risks to con-
sumers and shocks to the larger economy. Congress mandated specific units
and offices dedicated to engagement with underserved communities, service
members, and older Americans, among other vulnerable populations. Con-
gress also mandated a Consumer Advisory Board and a research agenda
that included a focus on the experiences and understanding of “traditionally
underserved communities.” Despite all the requirements of the Dodd-Frank
Act, however, during the height of the coronavirus pandemic, leadership at
the CFPB failed to act to protect those Black, Latinx, Indigenous, and im-
migrant communities hit hardest by both the economic and public health
impacts of COVID-19.
Congress required the agency to pay attention to marginalized and vul-
nerable communities, and yet, at a critical juncture, the leadership of the
agency did not. What went wrong? This Article examines the structure and
policy development under both Obama and Trump administration appoin-
tees, as well as the CFPB’s COVID-19 response, using the statutory imper-
ative to pay attention to marginalized and vulnerable communities as a lens.
The Article argues that, to fulfill the long-term vision of the Dodd-Frank
Act’s vision, the CFPB must go beyond its history to a deeper, more sus-
tained engagement with marginalized communities.
1. Founder, Consumer Rights Regulatory Engagement and Advocacy Project. This article was
written during the fall of 2020 while I was an Open Society Foundations Leadership in Government
Fellow. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the
United States. Kate Muñoz provided critical thought partnership at every step of this article. Travis
Doyle’s research assistance was essential. Nikka Pascador and Sarah Brandon helped sharpen my think-
ing about regulatory advocacy. Ron Borzekowski, Kelly Cochran, and David Silberman provided a
generous testing ground for the ideas in this article. I owe a special debt of gratitude to the talented and
dedicated staff and managers of the CFPB’s Office of Regulations 2014–19, who patiently schooled me
in the art and science of drafting regulations. As always, I remain deeply grateful to the people in East
St. Louis who gave me the distinct honor of being their attorney at the beginning of my legal career.
Their lived experiences, which they were generous enough to share with me, echo in my head and heart
and serve as my touchstone in this work.
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The CFPB must center the voices of marginalized communities in
every aspect of its work, from outreach, to foundational research, to integra-
tion of the diverse lived experiences of marginalized communities into the
CFPB’s policymaking. The CFPB must develop more robust internal struc-
tures to ensure the voices and experiences of marginalized communities are
heard and incorporated in policymaking throughout the agency. Regular re-
search reporting on the experiences of marginalized communities with con-
sumer financial products and services is needed to chart the path forward in
a way that balances the perpetual tension between access and protection,
while also enabling wealth creation and economic self-determination. For
the CFPB to make and sustain this shift, advocates must also recommit to
regulatory advocacy at the CFPB that centers and contextualizes the voices
and experiences of marginalized communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the middle of the coronavirus pandemic, the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) was shockingly absent. Congress created the
CFPB in the wake of the Great Recession to foresee, prevent, and mitigate
risks to consumers and ensuing shocks to the larger economy, but during
the height of a pandemic that claimed over 500,000 lives and left millions
out of work and behind on their rent and mortgage, the leadership of the
agency focused instead on continuing with a pre-pandemic deregulatory
agenda.
Congress required that the CFPB create a Consumer Advisory Board
(“CAB”) and mandated a research agenda centering the experiences and
understanding of “traditionally underserved communities.” Congress man-
dated specific units dedicated to engagement with servicemembers, older
Americans, and underserved communities, among other vulnerable popula-
tions. All of these prescriptions as to what and who the agency pay attention
to, even taken together, were not by themselves enough to keep the agency
focused on its consumer protection mission during the pandemic. At a time
when the country seemed finally to awaken to the magnitude and historical
persistence of intertwined racial and economic inequity, the CFPB targeted
consumers with messages to save more and rolled back fundamental re-
quirements that lenders consider borrowers’ ability to repay loans. The
voices of those historically excluded from and too often exploited by the
financial mainstream remained unheard.
Dodd-Frank’s mandate of a research agenda that explicitly required the
agency to consider the experiences and understanding of traditionally un-
derserved consumers and communities was by itself innovative. So too
were the requirements of units focused on specific populations with distinct
vulnerabilities. This novel vision of a government agency that integrated the
3
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diverse experiences of marginalized communities in its work, based on a
solid evidentiary foundation, was never fully realized.
The impressive consumer protection foundation laid during the Obama
administration and under its first Senate-confirmed Director, Richard Cor-
dray,2 was incomplete. The CFPB under the Obama administration was a
proto-agency, with a culture driven by the need to accomplish the big
rulemakings of Dodd-Frank at the same time the agency was hiring its first
staff, negotiating leases for office space, and establishing internal processes
and procedures. Long-term effective consumer protection that seeks to ad-
dress systemic inequity will require greater, more consistent focus than we
have yet seen from the CFPB.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Seila Law, LLC v. Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau3 in June 2020, the CFPB is here to stay.4 This
resolution of the CFPB’s constitutionality creates an opportunity for new
leadership to focus on the work of building an agency for the long term.
Both financial institutions and consumer protection can benefit from a sta-
ble regulatory environment. The agency must ground its work in the statute
and in empirical knowledge of the impact of financial products on under-
served communities if it is to make the most of this historical moment.
Dodd-Frank suggests an agency built on a deep engagement with di-
verse communities. Rural communities are given special attention in the
CFPB’s statutorily-mandated cost-benefit analysis.5 The CAB should in-
clude “representatives of communities that have been significantly im-
pacted by higher-priced mortgage loans.”6 Specific units are expected to
conduct outreach to service members7 and older Americans.8 A separate
office is expected to be equipped to provide “technical assistance regarding
the offering and provision of consumer financial products and services to
2. The CFPB Director serves by law for a five year term. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(1) (2021). Director
Cordray was confirmed by the Senate on July 16, 2013. On the Nomination (Confirmation of Richard
Cordray, of Ohio, to be Director, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection) Roll Vote 174, 113th
Cong., 1st Sess. (July 16, 2013), https://perma.cc/CA7R-GZUZ. He was sworn in the following morn-
ing. Phillip Rucker, Obama Takes Victory Lap as Cordray Is Sworn In, WASH. POST (July 17, 2013),
https://perma.cc/E675-H5WG. Director Cordray served for nearly a year under President Trump, re-
signing on November 24, 2017.
3. 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
4. The Supreme Court held in Seila that the CFPB’s structure was unconstitutional in the degree
of independence that the Director had from the President. The Court rectified that flaw by making the
Director removable at the President’s pleasure instead of only for cause. See, e.g., Kelly Anne Smith,
Supreme Court Says Trump Can Fire Consumer Watchdog Director, But CFPB Here to Stay, FORBES
(Jun. 30, 2020, 11:59 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/W9RL-J48K.
5. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii).
6. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2010). The statutes also calls-out for inclusion on the CAB “representa-
tives of depository institutions that primarily serve underserved communities.”
7. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e) (2021).
8. Id. § 5493(g).
4
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traditionally underserved consumers and communities.”9 Building produc-
tive relationships across so many different communities takes time. It can-
not be done and re-done every four years. Mutual relationships of trust and
open communication are built over years and sometimes decades.
Learning how to listen and how to integrate the “experiences of tradi-
tionally underserved consumers”10 into research and policy will take time.
Marginalized communities do not speak with a single voice or have a single
experience. But grounding the CFPB’s work in empirical knowledge of the
diversity of experiences with and understandings of credit by communities
across the country, and particularly those communities most marginalized
and underserved by the financial system, is required by the statute.11 Foun-
dational, empirical work should also provide the CFPB with a consistent,
non-ideological focus that in turn could allow the CFPB to better fulfill its
statutory mandate and survive the tests of time.
The CFPB describes itself as a 21st century agency.12 We should plan
for it to be a 22nd and even 23rd century agency. Even as different presi-
dential administrations with different policy preferences on consumer pro-
tection come and go, the CFPB must keep the voices and experiences of
marginalized communities at its core. Anything less betrays the statutory
mandate and the fundamental accountability to consumers and traditionally
underserved communities built into Dodd-Frank.
II. ORIGIN STORY
A. Out of the Ashes Comes a Phoenix
The years leading up to the enactment of Dodd-Frank in July 2010
were grim. Foreclosure rates stood at historic levels, multiples above where
they had been during the Great Depression.13 Unemployment was persist-
ently high.14 Millions of families lost their homes.15 Millions more watched
9. Id. § 5493(b).
10. Id. § 5493(b)(1)(F).
11. Id. § 5493(b)(1).
12. About Us, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (last visited May 17, 2021), https://perma.cc/TN6Q-
QRXB (“The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) is a 21st century agency . . . .”).
13. The U.S. foreclosure rate (the percentage of outstanding mortgage loans in foreclosure) at the
end of the first quarter of 2010 was 4.63%. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY
Q1 2010, at 2 (2010). The foreclosure rate for non-farm mortgages peaked in 1933, below 1.4%. David
C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression,
90 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 133, 138–39 fig.5 (2008).
14. See, e.g., Chart Book: The Legacy of the Great Recession, CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORI-
TIES (June 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/R88W-TW55 (“Job losses in the Great Recession were huge, and it
took much longer than in previous recessions simply to get back to the level of payroll employment at
the start of the recession.”).
5
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as the accumulated equity in their homes vanished.16 Speculators bought up
empty housing for rental and resale. Localities struggled as their property
tax base evaporated.17 Economic insecurity was widespread across the
world.18 In the span of a few short years, subprime lending in communities
of color went from something regulators assumed could not impact the
larger economy19 to a central topic of conversation on the front pages of
newspapers and over the airwaves.
While Republicans and Democrats sparred over the exact causes of the
crisis,20 regulators and investors discounted warning signs.21 Failure in the
subprime market spread across many other unrelated markets, to create “fi-
nancial shock and panic.”22 Consumer credit markets considered marginal
were clearly central to the country’s economic health. A new regulator, and
perhaps a new regulatory model, was needed to prevent a recurrence.23
The CFPB’s creation was a specific and targeted response to that cri-
sis, albeit a heavily politicized one.24 Many agreed with then-Professor
15. William R. Emmons, The End Is in Sight for the U.S. Foreclosure Crisis, HOUSING MARKET
PERSPECTIVES at 1 (Dec. 2016), https://perma.cc/AG97-EGNE (“As many as 10 million mortgage bor-
rowers have lost their homes.”).
16. Soaring Spillover: Accelerating Foreclosures to Cost Neighbors $502 Billion in 2009 Alone;
69.5 Million Homes Lose $7,200 on Average, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING at 2 (May 2009), https://
perma.cc/LX4Q-VRB2 (estimating losses to neighboring property values due to the foreclosure crisis at
$1.86 trillion dollars during the years 2009 to 2013).
17. William Apgar & Mark Duda, Collateral Damage: The Municipal Impact of Today’s Mortgage
Foreclosure Boom, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRESERVATION FOUND. 4 (May 11, 2005), https://perma.cc/CNJ7-
7L4L (estimating per-foreclosure costs to the City of Chicago at upwards of $30,000 for some vacant
properties); Majority Staff of the Joint Econ. Comm., The Subprime Lending Crisis: The Economic
Impact on Wealth, Property, Values and Tax Revenues and How We Got Here, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON.
COMM. at 1, 12 (Oct. 2007), https://perma.cc/4BKK-6WQ9 (projecting loss of property tax revenue of
over $917 million).
18. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the
Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets: Housing, Mortgage Markets,
and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008), https://perma.cc/B2ZQ-WTN5 (“Despite good-faith efforts by both the
private and public sectors, the foreclosure rate remains too high, with adverse consequences for both
those directly involved and for the broader economy.”).
19. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 9 (2011), https://
perma.cc/UN8W-MWQ6 [ hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (“[P]olicymakers believed
that even if the housing market tanked, the broader financial system and economy would hold up.”).
20. See, e.g., id. at 411–538 (dissenting statements).
21. See, e.g., id. at xvii.
22. Id. at 417 (dissenting statement).
23. See, e.g., DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION:
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 55 (2010), https://perma.cc/6CCA-QTUJ [here-
inafter REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010)] (“While this crisis had many
causes, it is clear now that the government could have done more to prevent many of these problems
from growing out of control and threatening the stability of our financial system. . . No regulator saw its
job as protecting the economy and financial system as a whole.”).
24. See, e.g., Daniel Bush, What is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Anyway?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Nov. 27, 2017, 4:39 PM EST), https://perma.cc/5HKF-7NLS (“The agency has been con-
troversial since its inception six years ago.”); Joe Nocera, CFPB Emerges from Trump Storm Battered
6
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Elizabeth Warren that the “tattered patchwork” of laws regulating the con-
sumer financial products and services market contributed to the crisis.25 In-
consistent application and enforcement of both consumer protection laws
and fair lending laws had enabled the financial exploitation of certain com-
munities and jeopardized the entire economic system. The remedy was a
single agency with a singular focus: consumer protection.26 Implicit was the
belief that paying attention to the impact of financial products on unde-
served communities could have forestalled the Great Recession and might
forestall future national economic crises.27
The creation of the CFPB was, specifically and explicitly, deeply
grounded in racial and economic equity. Legislators understood that preda-
tory subprime lending and inflated housing prices had taken down the U.S.
financial system,28 and the hard-earned accumulated wealth of many fami-
lies, particularly Black and Latinx families,29 along with it. While some
would fault borrower choice and others would argue that the problem was
the expansion of credit to borrowers who could not afford to repay,30 most
but Intact, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 27, 2021 6:00 AM EST), https://perma.cc/D5Q2-ZK9G (“From
the moment the CFPB was created in July 2011 as part of the Dodd-Frank financial reform law, conserv-
atives have been gunning for it.”). See generally S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 231, 246–47 (2010) (noting the
Dodd-Frank Act was voted out of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs with-
out any Republican support and representing the minority’s views that the CFPB posed a threat to civil
liberties and free enterprise). Cf. Editorial, Republicans Side with Banks Over Consumers, USA TODAY
(July 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/J7QA-HGQC (noting that “all but one” of the House Republicans, and
no House Democrats, voted in 2017 in favor of a bill “to gut” the CFPB).
25. Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY: A J. OF IDEAS (Summer 2007). See
REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 2 (“Multiple agencies
have authority over consumer protection in financial products, but . . . the supervisory framework for
enforcing those regulations had significant gaps and weaknesses. Banking regulators . . . had a poten-
tially conflicting mission to promote safe and sound banking practices, while other agencies had . . .
limited tools and jurisdiction.”); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 19, at 308 (noting that
the “patchwork quilt of regulators created opportunities for banks to shop for the most lenient regula-
tor”); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 3 (quoting FDIC Republican Chairman Sheila Bair as saying that the
“existence of one regulatory scheme for insured institutions and a much less effective regulatory scheme
for non-bank entities created the conditions for arbitrage that permitted the development of risk and
harmful products and services outside regulated entities.”). See generally S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 14–15
(cataloging concerns about current consumer financial protection regulation and promising that the
“CFPB will stop regulatory arbitrage.”).
26. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11.
27. See, e.g., REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 57
(“A single agency, such as the CFPA, could have acted much more quickly and potentially saved many
more consumers, communities, and institutions from significant losses.”).
28. Even the main Republican dissent on the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission agreed that com-
bined credit and housing bubbles, coupled with the sale of what were tactfully called “nontraditional”
mortgages, were leading causes of the Great Recession. FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note
19, at 417.
29. See, e.g., Edward Wolff, The Decline of African-American and Hispanic Wealth Since the
Great Recession, VOXEU, CEPR (Dec. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/Y6CH-7WH9.
30. See, e.g., FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 19, at 154.
7
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subprime loans went to borrowers with prime credit scores.31 Families who
could have repaid a traditional mortgage loan were instead shunted into
expensive, inappropriate products. The result was further economic
marginalization for those already marginalized.
The Senate Report on Dodd-Frank recognized the disproportionate im-
pact of the mortgage crisis on Black, Latinx, and low-income families of all
races.32 The Senate Report cited the 2007 HMDA data.33 As Federal Re-
serve researchers noted in their review of the 2007 HMDA data, “Gross
differences in the incidence of higher-priced lending between non-Hispanic
whites, on the one hand, and [B]lacks or Hispanic whites, on the other, are
large . . . .”34 According to the Senate Report, 54% of African Americans
and 47% of Hispanics received high-cost mortgages in 2006, compared to
only 18% of non-Hispanic whites.35 The Federal Reserve researchers listed
certain factors they deemed “borrower-related”: income, loan amount, loca-
tion of the property, whether or not there was a co-applicant for the loan,
and the sex of the borrower.36 The Senate Report stated that these borrower-
related factors, including income, accounted for only one-sixth of the dis-
parity.37 To this day, families of color, and Black families in particular,
have not recovered from the economic fallout of the subprime lending
boom and bust.38
31. Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy: As Housing
Boomed, Industry Pushed Loans to a Broader Market, WALL ST. J. at A1 (Dec. 3, 2007), (reporting that
61% percent of subprime borrowers in 2006 were prime eligible based on their credit score).
32. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 14–15.
33. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15.
34. Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort, & Glenn B. Canner, The 2007 HMDA Data, 94 FED.
RES. BULL. A107, A139 (Dec. 2008), https://perma.cc/CW5J-ZWMN. Although not discussed in either
the Senate Report or in the Federal Reserve Board study, American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native
Hawaiians, and other Pacific Islanders, were also much more likely to receive a higher-priced loan than
non-Hispanic whites. The researchers noted that controlling for the lender and available borrower-re-
lated factors, including income, reduced but did not eliminate the gap. Id. at A139–41 (tables 18A &
18B). Of course, steering Black and Latino borrowers to subprime lenders could well explain why
controlling for lender reduced the disparities between Black, Latino, and non-Hispanic white borrowers
in the rates at which they received higher-priced mortgage loans.
35. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15; see also Avery, et al., supra note 34, at A107, A139-A140 (discuss-
ing pricing differences correlated to race and ethnicity).
36. Avery, et al., supra note 34, at A107, A137 (Dec. 2008). Residential segregation makes control-
ling for property location, as way of identifying how much of the lending disparity is racially linked,
particularly unreliable.
37. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15. See also Id. at A140–41 (tables 18A & 18B) (showing rates of
higher-priced lending by race, ethnicity, and sex, for home purchase and refinance loans, with and
without controlling for “borrower-related” factors and lender).
38. See, e.g., Alanna McCargo & Jung Hyun Choi, Closing the Gaps: Building Black Wealth
Through Homeownership, URBAN INST. 2 (Nov. 2020), https://perma.cc/X2ZJ-ZBNK; Emily Moss,
Kristin McIntosh, Wendy Edelberg & Kristen E. Brody, The Black-White Wealth Gap Left Black House-
holds More Vulnerable, BROOKINGS (Dec. 8, 2020), https://perma.cc/Y9K6-ZMLQ (“[T]he Great Reces-
sion exacerbated the Black-white wealth gap and left Black households more vulnerable to the current
COVID-19 recession.”).
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Dodd-Frank would build on this understanding of the origins of the
financial crisis, and its disparate impact on marginalized communities, in a
range of provisions instructing the CFPB to pay particular attention to “tra-
ditionally underserved communities.”39 The term “traditionally underserved
communities” is undefined in Dodd-Frank and only referenced glancingly
in the Treasury white paper elaborating on the concept of what would be-
come the CFPB.40 In those glancing mentions, Treasury linked “fair lend-
ing” and “underserved consumers and communities.”41
These provisions in Dodd-Frank did not explain how the CFPB was
supposed to integrate racial and economic equity into its policymaking or
how the voices and experiences of marginalized communities would influ-
ence policymaking. As with previous legislation aimed at addressing sys-
temic financial exclusion, the language of Dodd-Frank can be maddeningly
indirect and inconclusive. Even though race was clearly part of what the
CFPB was supposed to pay attention to, Congress did not instruct the
agency how to pay attention to race and racial equity.
Even with these ambiguities, Dodd-Frank went significantly further
than previous attempts to address systemic racial and economic inequity.
The racial impact of the foreclosure crisis was devastatingly plain in 2010,
when Congress passed Dodd-Frank.  Advocates who had fought for decades
to build and preserve capital in communities of color and other marginal-
ized communities had high hopes and expectations for the CFPB.
B. Dodd-Frank: Who Are Traditionally Underserved Communities?
1. A Short History: From the FPSC to the CFPB
The idea of a unitary agency to regulate consumer financial protection
is usually traced to a short article Elizabeth Warren wrote in 2007.42 War-
ren’s initial proposal was for a “Financial Product Safety Commission”
39. See generally II.B.3, infra.
40. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 15, 58, 69.
41. See, e.g., REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 15
(“The Agency should enforce fair lending laws and the Community Reinvestment Act and otherwise
seek to ensure that underserved consumers and communities have access to prudent financial services,
lending, and investment.”).
42. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 24 (“The idea for a financial watchdog agency came from Sen.
Elizabeth Warren, . . . a Harvard Law School professor at the time. Warren first proposed creating the
agency in 2007 as a way to better regulate mortgages, student loans, and other financial products.”);
Lydia DePillis, A watchdog grows up: The inside story of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
WASH. POST (Jan. 11, 2014, 9:28 AM EST), https://perma.cc/852N-2ZC6 (“The bureau began as an idea
published in 2007 in Democracy Journal, a small lefty quarterly. Its author, a Harvard Law School
bankruptcy professor named Elizabeth Warren . . . described a feisty ‘Financial Product Safety Commis-
sion’ whose emissaries would be as familiar to Americans as firefighters.”),
9
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(“FPSC”).43 Warren modeled her proposed FPSC on the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (“CPSC”), which regulates items like children’s sleep-
wear and toasters.44 Like the CPSC, Warren’s FPSC would have focused on
safety and disclosure. Warren’s central thesis was that financial products
are sufficiently complex that it is unreasonable for consumers to evaluate all
the risks of those products just as we do not expect a purchaser of a toaster
“to become an engineer.”45 Warren’s short piece does not mention race,
“traditionally underserved communities,” or “traditionally underserved con-
sumers,” although, of course, the risks of an exploding adjustable rate mort-
gage and the other financial products she cites as “unsafe at any rate” were
more concentrated in communities of color and low-income communities.46
By the time the United States Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”)
put out its white paper on financial regulatory reform, the proposed
agency’s working title was the Consumer Financial Protection Agency
(“CFPA”).47 The CFPA was structured to put consumers first and to reduce
the supervisory gaps Treasury believed had led to the crisis.48 So far, Trea-
sury closely followed Warren’s proposal.
43. Warren, supra note 25, at 5.
44. Warren started her article by comparing credit products to toasters:
It is impossible to buy a toaster that has a one-in-five chance of bursting into flames and
burning down your house. But it is possible to refinance an existing home with a mortgage
that has the same one-in-five chance of putting the family out on the street—and the mortgage
won’t even carry a disclosure of that fact to the homeowner. Similarly, it’s impossible to
change the price on a toaster once it has been purchased. But long after the papers have been
signed, it is possible to triple the price of the credit used to finance the purchase of that
appliance, even if the customer meets all the credit terms, in full and on time. Why are con-
sumers safe when they purchase tangible consumer products with cash, but when they sign up
for routine financial products like mortgages and credit cards they are left at the mercy of their
creditors?
Id. (keeping consumers safe from toasters continues to be part of the CPSC’s work, with recalls of
defective toasters in 2019, Bodum Recalls Toasters Due to Shock Hazard, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY
COMMISSION (last visited Jan. 22, 2021), https://perma.cc/F43T-G8MJ, and a recall of a toy toaster in
2014).
45. Warren, supra note 25.
46. E.g., Vikas Bajaj & Ron Nixon, For Minorities, Signs of Trouble in Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 22, 2006), https://perma.cc/AY64-8N6S; Geoff Smith, Woodstock Institute, Key Trends in Chi-
cago Area Mortgage Lending: Analysis of Data from the Chicago Area Community Lending Fact Book
(2006), https://perma.cc/H7YE-XXYZ; Neighborhood Econ. Dev. Advocacy Project, Home Mortgage
Lending and Foreclosures in Three New York City Neighborhoods: Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn,
Cypress Hills, Brooklyn, Jamaica, Queens (2002), https://perma.cc/6VAD-G6N3; Ellen Schloemer, Wei
Li, Keith Ernst & Kathleen Keest, Losing Ground: Foreclosures in the Subprime Market & Their Cost
to Homeowners, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 7 (Dec. 2006), https://perma.cc/QSC9-J5VR.
47. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW FOUNDATION: RE-
BUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 55 (2009) [hereinafter REBUILDING FINANCIAL SU-
PERVISION AND REGULATION (2009)].
48. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 57 (“Creating
a single federal agency . . . with supervisory, examination, and enforcement authority for protecting
consumers would better promote accountability and help prevent regulatory arbitrage. A federally super-
10
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Treasury built on to the safety and disclosure focus of Warren’s arti-
cle—ultimately an approach based on protection—an affirmative obligation
to promote financial inclusion.49 Treasury included in the CFPA’s mandate
ensuring that traditionally underserved consumers and communities had ac-
cess to financial services.50 Treasury proposed that the CFPA would have a
range of authorities and tools to make sure communities of color and low-
income communities were well served by consumer financial products and
services.51 The CFPA would have had jurisdiction over the Community Re-
investment Act (“CRA”) to promote access to credit for underserved com-
munities and consumers, as well enforcement authority over fair lending
laws and data collection for both mortgage and small business lending.52
Treasury envisioned a “community affairs function” that would “promote
community development investment and fair and impartial access to
credit.”53 The inclusion of this lens of access, and the vision of the agency
as a champion of community development and fair lending, pushed the
agency’s obligations towards racial and economic equity.
Notably, Treasury advocated an external advisory panel to “promote
. . . accountability” in the CFPA’s rulemaking.54 Treasury thought the advi-
sory panel would bring “deep” expertise in “financial services and commu-
nity development” to the CFPA. This twinning of financial services and
community development again suggests a vision of the agency as a cham-
pion for using financial services to provide capital for underserved commu-
nities, with accountability for community development.
Within weeks of the release of the Treasury white paper, the Obama
administration released a detailed legislative proposal for the creation of a
Consumer Financial Protection Agency.55 The 2009 Obama legislative pro-
posal to create the CFPA carried over key features from the Treasury white
paper. It included an objective for the CFPA to provide access to under-
vised institution would no longer be able to choose its supervisor based on any consideration of . . .
differences in . . . consumer protection . . . .”).
49. Id., at 69 (“A critical part of the CFPA’s mission should be to promote access to financial
services, especially for households and communities that traditionally have had limited access.”).
50. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), supra note 47, at 55, 58.
51. See generally REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at
69–70 (discussing the need for the CFPA to “enforce fair lending laws and the Community Reinvest-
ment Act and otherwise seek to ensure that underserved consumers and communities have access to
prudent financial services, lending, and investment.”).
52. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009), supra note 47, at 69–70.
53. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 62.
54. Id. at 60.
55. Administration’s Regulatory Reform Agenda Moves Forward: Legislation for Strengthening
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served consumers and a unit focusing on consumer affairs.56 It would have
provided for the CFPA to have primary authority under the CRA rather than
leaving CRA authority dispersed among the various federal financial au-
thorities.57 It too would have established an advisory panel focused on fi-
nancial services and community development, although with the addition of
expertise on consumer financial services and products and no explicit men-
tion of “accountability.”58 And, in a move that bridged the two approaches,
one of fostering inclusion for underserved communities and the other of
consumer protection, it would have required monitoring of risks affecting
underserved consumers.59
Title X of Dodd-Frank retained and even expanded the identification
of underserved communities for specific attention by the CFPB through the
creation of specific offices, the elaboration of a research agenda, and the
specific identification of communities harmed by high-cost mortgage lend-
ing in the composition of the Consumer Advisory Board.60 The CAB was
now also required to have fair lending expertise and representatives of civil
rights groups, among other changes. Monitoring for risks to underserved
communities remained a “consideration” of the market monitoring func-
tion.61
Title X of Dodd-Frank was both more specific and more vague regard-
ing which groups should get the CFPB’s focus. It created offices specifi-
cally for service members and older Americans, but diluted the focus on
development and financial inclusion. The community affairs function, origi-
nally envisaged by Treasury as serving a cheerleader role for fair lending,62
was separate and more focused, under the statutory language, on “technical
assistance” rather than “promotion” of fair lending, financial inclusion, or
community development.63
The access mandate moved from promoting access for the traditionally
underserved to the broader mandate of access for “all consumers,”64 and
title X did not include CRA authority among the CFPB’s authorities. In
broadening the focus from access for those historically marginalized com-
56. Title X–Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, at 15, 19 (the community affairs
unit provided for in the Obama legislative proposal dropped the focus on community development and
promotion of fair lending and shifted instead to “providing information, guidance, and technical assis-
tance regarding the provision of consumer financial products or services to traditionally underserved
consumers or communities.”).
57. Id. at 110–12.
58. Id. at 15.
59. Id. at 27.
60. See generally II.B.3, infra.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(2)(E) (2018).
62. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 62.
63. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(2).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a).
12
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munities, and in dampening the focus on community development, the pur-
pose of promoting access was lost. No longer did the promotion of access
unambiguously mean access to community development funds for tradition-
ally underserved communities. In title X, the CFPB was tasked with pro-
moting access for all consumers, as a good in itself, decoupled from the
consequences of that access.
2. The CRA and CDFIs: Defining Underserved
As we saw above, Treasury introduced the language regarding “under-
served communities and consumers” that Congress would ultimately in-
clude in Dodd-Frank. Treasury, and Dodd-Frank, did not define the term or
explain how the CFPB should think about its relationship to “traditionally
underserved communities.” The term “underserved” seems to trace back to
the anti-redlining work of the 1960s and 1970s that culminated in the pas-
sage of the CRA.65 Its survival in Dodd-Frank, even though authority under
the CRA was not, in the end, transferred to the CFPB, speaks of a specific,
activist view of the role of credit in marginalized communities coupled with
a deep understanding of the relationship between racial and economic eq-
uity.
The CRA was based on Congress’s controversial finding that regulated
financial institutions have an “affirmative obligation” to “help meet the
credit needs of the local communities.”66 Regulators were charged with “as-
sess[ing] the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.”67 Finan-
cial institutions and regulatory agencies were united in their opposition to
the bill.68 Under the CRA, the federal regulators evaluate banks’ lending,
investments, community development, and retail banking services.69 Poor
CRA ratings can be leveraged by community groups to negotiate significant
65. See Upholding the Spirit of CRA: Do CRA Ratings Accurately Reflect Bank Practices?: Hear-
ing Before the H. Subcomm. on Dom. Pol’y of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
110th Cong. 124 (2007) [hereinafter Upholding the Spirit of CRA] (statement of Calvin Bradford) (com-
munity organizations advocated for defining in the CRA “historically underserved” communities as ones
“characterized by minority . . . populations, lower income household, or an older housing stock”).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(3). Compare, e.g., Community Credit Needs: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 132 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings Before
the S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs] (statement of Gale Cincotta) (“I agree fully with
the concept that all financial institutions have an affirmative obligation to meet the credit needs of all
our citizens and their neighborhoods.”); with, e.g., A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act
Reconsidered, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1514 (1995) (“[I]t is indefensible to assert that, through the
CRA, private institutions should bear the risk for [affirmative targeted lending] programs.”).
67. Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a).
68. Upholding the Spirit of CRA, supra note 65, at 125 (statement of Calvin Bradford).
69. 12 U.S.C. 2901(b). See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. 228.21–29 (Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ stan-
dards for assessing banks’ CRA performance).
13
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community reinvestment commitments by lending institutions.70 Decades
later, the CRA and the affirmative obligations it imposes on financial insti-
tutions to help meet the credit needs of low- and moderate-income commu-
nities remain controversial.71
The CRA, passed by Congress in 1977,72 was born out of the prodig-
ious organizing work of Gale Cincotta and National People’s Action.73
Cincotta, described by the New York Times at her death as “a plainspoken
mother of six,”74 helped lead the movement to make banking and other
financial institutions more responsive to the communities in which they
were located and from which they drew their capital.75 Reading hearings on
the CRA, one is struck by Cincotta’s tenacity of vision: here she is intro-
ducing a panel of neighborhood activists, all prepared to talk about bank
70. See, e.g., Greater Rochester Community Reinvestment Coalition, Comment Letter OCC (Nov.
16, 2018), https://perma.cc/2ZC2-562R (“Since 1996, CRA has leveraged almost $2 trillion in small
business loans and community development loans and investments in low-moderate income communi-
ties across the country.”). See generally Raphael W. Bostic & Breck L. Robinson, Do CRA Agreements
Influence Lending Patterns, 31 REAL ESTATE ECON. 23 (2008) (discussing increases in lending to lower-
income and minority communities in response to CRA agreements).
71. Joseph Otting, the Comptroller of the Currency under Donald Trump and the former CEO
OneWest Bank, “had made overhauling CRA a priority” of his time at the head of the OCC and an-
nounced his resignation the day after the OCC released its rules. Andrew Ackerman, Fed Moves to
Overhaul Lending Rules for Poorer Communities, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2020, 2:09 PM EST), https://
perma.cc/JAZ5-F42R. The National Community Reinvestment Coalition, an advocacy group dedicated
to using the CRA to improve access to capital in marginalized communities, has led the charge to
preserve the CRA from what it characterizes as attempts to gut the CRA. See generally It’s Our Money.
Keep it in our Neighborhoods, NCRC (last visited Jan. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/WER9-RJX7.
72. Pub. L. No. 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 (1977) (codified as amended at 12. U.S.C. §§ 2901–2907).
73. See, e.g., Upholding the Spirit of CRA, supra note 65, at 116 (statement of Calvin Bradford);
Michael Barry & Jessie Romero, Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Fed. Reserve History, https://
perma.cc/TM75-SVFZ; Marijoan Bull, Data, Accountability, and the Public: Using Community Rein-
vestment Act Data for Local Community Development, 19 CITYSCAPE 161, 162 (2017); Douglas Martin,
Gail Cincotta, 72, Opponent of Biased Banking Policies, N.Y. TIMES B9 (Aug. 17, 2001), https://
perma.cc/P55D-FJGA.
74. Martin, supra note 73, at B9. While the description in the N.Y. Times’s obituary seems faintly
patronizing and certainly unnecessarily gender-signaling, Nancy Pelosi, another powerful and indefati-
gable person, has said that being the mother of five children was instrumental in her developing her own
leadership style and abilities. Ellen McCarthy, ‘Makes Going to Work Look Easy’: Decades Before She
Was House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi Had an Even Harder Job, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2019, 1:32 PM
MST), https://perma.cc/3F66-FRNH.
75. See, e.g., If Federally or Insured Lenders Have Fulfilled Their Affirmative Obligations to Make
Loans in Their Communities and If the Federal Regulators Met Their Legal Responsibilities: Hearings
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1988) (statement of Sen.
Proxmire) (“Gale Cincotta is . . . an old friend of the committee . . . and she’s a person who’s done a
tremendous amount of fine work in this . . . throughout the country.”); Calvin Bradford & Gale Cincotta,
The Legacy, the Promise, & the Unfulfilled Agenda, FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY
RESPONSES TO URBAN DISINVESTMENT 228 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992) (stressing that one purpose of
the CRA was to ensure that banks reinvested deposits in the communities they took deposits from). See
generally MICHAEL WESTGATE & ANN VICK-WESTGATE, GALE FORCE—GALE CINCOTTA: THE BATTLES
FOR DISCLOSURE AND COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT (2011).
14
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redlining in their communities;76 there, she is describing a sophisticated
lobbying strategy to strengthen the CRA, covering the White House, admin-
istrative agencies, and Congress; and there again, referring Senators to an
eight-city study of the prevalence of redlining, based on the then-brand-new
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HMDA”) data.77 Of course, Cincotta was
instrumental in the passage of HMDA in 1975 as well.78
Although the CRA’s statutory language is centered on geographic ar-
eas and communities divided by income, not race, recognition of race was
embedded in its DNA.79 Cincotta called out race as a factor in the neighbor-
hood disinvestment the CRA was meant to remedy.80 She recognized the
intertwining of geography and community, and of race and space.81 De-
cades later, in the face of the clear evidence that Black and Latinx commu-
nities were both underserved traditional banking products and overserved
high-cost home mortgages, Representative Dennis Kucinich would declare,
simply, “Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act in 1977 to
combat redlining practices by the banks.”82 The CRA continues to be used
by community advocates to promote both racial and economic justice on
behalf of specific communities.83
Cincotta urged Congress to define specifically historically underserved
communities as the intended beneficiaries of the CRA:
Congress must recognize that many communities have historically been un-
derserved. S. 406 should include provisions that address the needs of histori-
cally underserved areas . . . . The bill should therefore be amended to in-
76. Community Credit Needs: Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. On Fin. Institutions of the Comm.
On Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 817 (1978) [hereinafter Hearings Before the H. Sub-
comm. On Fin. Institutions of the Comm. On Banking, Fin., and Urban Affairs].
77. Hearings Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin. Institutions of the Comm. on Banking, Fin., and
Urban Affairs, supra note 76, at 965 (statement of Gale Cincotta).
78. Edmund Mierwinski, Regulation as Civic Empowerment, AM. PROSPECT (June 27, 2009),
https://perma.cc/6HKD-YS5B.
79. See Overby, supra note 66, at 1504 (“The attention in the CRA debates and hearings to the
problem of redlining . . . makes it plain that Congress was aware of the interrelationship between the
CRA, credit needs, and discrimination.”).
80. See, e.g., Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note
66, at 136 (statement of Gale Cincotta) (noting that areas of heavy FHA lending were also ones with a
higher percentage of Spanish speakers).
81.  Upholding the Spirit of CRA, supra note 65, at 125 (statement of Calvin Bradford) (noting that
the push to define “historically underserved areas” came in part from the evidence that low- to moder-
ate-income white neighborhoods adjoining African American neighborhoods also suffered disinvest-
ment and that white opposition to integration came, in part, from fear of disinvestment).
82. See, e.g., Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich) (“Congress enacted the Community
Reinvestment Act in 1977 to combat redlining practices by the banks.”).
83. See generally Manual CRA 101, NAT’L COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION (last visited
Aug. 30, 11:07 PM EST), https://perma.cc/7F6E-QSPG; see also Raphael W. Bostic & Breck L. Robin-
son, Do CRA Agreements Influence Lending  Patterns, 31 REAL ESTATE ECON. 23 (2008) (noting the use
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clude underserved areas as specific areas where credit needs are more acute
and where financial institutions should place special emphasis on meeting
those needs.84
Congress declined the invitation, but the language of the “underserved” re-
mained in currency to describe what the CRA was meant to do and whom it
was meant to serve. To this day, when advocates, policy makers, and finan-
cial institutions speak of the CRA, they often use the shorthand of “under-
served” communities to refer both to communities of color and low-income
communities.
Cincotta did not get the targeted lending programs for historically un-
derserved communities she sought in the CRA. Two decades later, the
Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act created
a Community Development Financial Institutions (“CDFI”) Fund.85 The
CDFI Fund, an agency within Treasury,86 was a partial response to
Cincotta’s observation that historically underserved communities needed af-
firmative reinvestment. Under the Act, CDFIs would receive some limited
federal funding (and tax advantages) in return for providing the targeted
reinvestment Cincotta had sought to make an affirmative obligation of all
financial institutions.87 Like the CRA, the Riegle Community Development
and Regulatory Improvement Act nowhere uses the word “underserved.”
Yet like the CRA, the concept of communities underserved by mainstream
institutions and society’s affirmative obligation to remedy financial exclu-
sion is nonetheless embedded in the creation of the CDFI Fund.88
84. Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, supra note 66, at 132
(statement of Gale Cincotta).
85. Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
325, § 104, 108 Stat. 2160 (1994).
86. Sean Lowry, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(CDFI) FUND: PROGRAMS AND POLICY ISSUES 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/DQF4-DZ6F (explaining that
the CDFI Fund was originally an independent agency but was moved to be an agency within the Trea-
sury in 1995).
87. See generally id.
88. See, e.g., id. at 1, 7 (“CDFIs are specialized financial institutions that work in market niches
that are underserved by traditional financial institution”; “[a]ll of the Fund’s programs use geographi-
cally targeted incentives intended to increase community development in underserved and distressed
communities, where certain types of economic activity might not otherwise occur.”). See generally
§ 102, 108 Stat. at 2106:
(a) FINDINGS. —The Congress finds that—
(1) many of the Nation’s urban, rural, and Native American communities face critical
social and economic problems arising in part from the lack of economic growth, people
living in poverty, and the lack of employment and other opportunities;
(2) the restoration and maintenance of the economies of these communities will require
coordinated development strategies, intensive supportive services, and increased access to
equity investments and loans for development activities, including investment in busi-
nesses, housing, commercial real estate, human development, and other activities that pro-
mote the long term economic and social viability of the community;
16
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Under its authorizing statute, the CDFI Fund defines the “targeted pop-
ulation” that an individual CDFI serves as “low-income persons” or those
who “otherwise lack adequate access to loans or equity investments.”89 By
2010, Congress and the CDFI Fund itself were routinely using “under-
served” as shorthand for the communities the CDFI Fund was meant to
serve.90 As described in a 2010 Federal Register notice, the CDFI Fund’s
“mission is to expand the capacity of financial institutions to provide credit,
capital and financial services to underserved populations and communities
in the United States.”91
In other words, for the CDFI Fund, and those at Treasury who incorpo-
rated its model, the primary meaning of “underserved” was, as with the
CRA, low-income communities. Those who used the term “underserved”
often also had in mind communities of color that “otherwise lack[ed] ade-
quate access to loans or equity investments.”92 In a society built on centu-
ries of racial exclusion, Black communities in particular would almost al-
ways “lack adequate access to loans or equity investments.”93 As Represen-
tative David Scott noted in a 2010 hearing, “Because the history of it is that
these CDFIs came about because of the outmigration of White communi-
ties. These communities became African American in many cases, and
when the White community left, the banks left, and they were under-
served.”94
Congress also used the term “underserved” in setting affordable hous-
ing goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the government sponsored en-
(3) community development financial institutions have proven their ability to identify and
respond to community needs for equity investments, loans, and development services.
89. 12 U.S.C. § 4702(20) (2018). The statute also required the CDFI Fund to be geographically
diverse over metropolitan and rural areas. 12 U.S.C. § 4706(b). In this way, too, it was a precursor to the
CFPB’s requirement to give special consideration to rural areas in evaluating the impact and effective-
ness of its rules. See 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii).
90. See, e.g., Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs): Their Unique Role and
Challenges Serving Lower-Income, Underserved, and Minority Communities: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. On Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 106 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 107-59, at 48 (2001) [hereinafter Com-
munity Development Financial Institutions] (“Recipients must use the funds to support mortgage, small
business and economic development lending in currently underserved, distressed neighborhoods.”).
91. Request for Public Comment: Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, Commu-
nity Development Financial and Technical Assistance Awards, Native Initiatives, and Bank Enterprise
Awards, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,561 (Mar. 8, 2010).
92. Request for Public Comment: Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, Commu-
nity Development Financial and Technical Assistance Awards, Native Initiatives, and Bank Enterprise
Awards, 75 Fed. Reg. 10,561, 10,562 (Mar. 8, 2010). Cf. Michael Neal, To Significantly Increase Access
to Capital for Communities of Color, We Need to Support Black Banks and All CDFIs, URBAN INST.
BLOG (July 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/73RN-9LJY (reporting that more than a third of CDFIs are led
by minorities and nearly half of CDFIs’ loans and investments go to majority-minority communities).
93. See generally MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP (2017).
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terprises (“GSEs”).95 Again, the focus was on low- to moderate-income
families.96 As with the CDFI Fund and the CFPB, rural communities were
called out for special attention, as well.97 In setting the GSE goals for un-
derserved areas, the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) defined underserved by reference to low rates of mortgage origi-
nations and high rates of mortgage denials.98 Unsurprisingly, these were, as
HUD noted, “high minority census tracts,” even though the formal defini-
tion only referenced income levels.99
During the 2007–08 financial crisis and in the hearings leading to the
passage of Dodd-Frank, many used the term “underserved” somewhat more
fluidly and expansively. For example, President Bush’s Advisory Council
on Financial Literacy included immigrants, low-income individuals, and
minorities in its discussion of the “credit underserved.”100 Congressional
witnesses routinely used “underserved” to describe low-income and minor-
ity communities, as well as, occasionally, older Americans.
In using the language of “underserved” in Dodd-Frank, Congress in-
voked these decades of work to promote access to a specific kind of credit
and capital: community development funds. “Underserved” was always
used to point towards those excluded from the financial mainstream and
nearly always coupled with a recognition of some affirmative obligation to
remedy past, traditional, or historical exclusion and predatory inclusion.
The framers of Dodd-Frank were responding to the largest foreclosure crisis
in the nation’s history, and the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression. In a consumer financial protection agency, they also sought to
address financial exclusion. The CFPB was meant to be a force for inclu-
sion and racial and economic equity.
3. A Pointillist Picture Emerges: Dodd-Frank and Traditionally
Underserved Communities
Title X of Dodd-Frank itself never defines “traditionally underserved
communities.” But it does use the term in several places in the statute, par-
ticularly in the sections establishing the “specific functional units” of Re-
95. 12 U.S.C. § 4565 (2018). See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 19, at
38–42 (discussing the history of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the affordable housing goals).
96. 12 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(1).
97. 12 U.S.C. § 4565(a)(1)(C).
98. Office of Pol’y Dev. and Research, Dep’t of Housing and Urban Dev. HUD’s Affordable Lend-
ing Goals for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 3 (Jan. 2001), https://perma.cc/G567-52CC.
99. Office of Pol’y Dev. and Research, supra note 98, at 3.
100. PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON FINANCIAL LITERACY, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT, 31–32.
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search and Community Affairs101 and in the section detailing the CFPB’s
market monitoring function.102 Dodd-Frank also calls out other specific
communities for the CFPB’s attention, including “communities that have
been particularly impacted by higher-priced mortgage loans,”103 ser-
vicemembers,104 older Americans,105 and student loan borrowers.106 It calls
out repeatedly the centrality of fair lending to the CFPB’s work, in the stat-
utorily-mandated Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, to be
headed by an Assistant Director,107 in the composition of the Consumer
Advisory Board108 and in the CFPB’s objectives.109 And it creates an Of-
fice of Financial Education, charged with “empower[ing]” consumers, not
merely passively “educating” them.110
The first “specific functional unit” to appear in Dodd-Frank is re-
search.111 Congress charged the Director with “establish[ing] a unit to re-
search, analyze, and report on” six specific aspects of consumer financial
products and services:
• Market developments, including “alternative consumer financial prod-
ucts or services with high growth rates and areas of risk to consumers”;
• “access to fair and affordable credit for traditionally underserved com-
munities”;
• disclosures and consumer use of disclosures;
• consumer understanding of the risks and pricing of consumer financial
products and services;
101. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1) (2021) (requiring a research unit, whose work includes research on
“access to fair and affordable credit for traditionally underserved communities” and “the experiences of
traditionally underserved consumers”); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(2) (requiring a unit of community affairs
“whose functions shall include providing information, guidance, and technical assistance regarding the
offering and provision of consumer financial products or services to traditionally underserved consumers
and communities”).
102. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(2)(E) (providing that considerations for the CFPB’s market monitoring
may include, among others, “the extent, if any, to which the risks of a consumer financial product or
service may disproportionately affect traditionally underserved consumers”).
103. Id. § 5494(b) (membership of the Consumer Advisory Board).
104. Id. § 5493(e) (establishing the Office of Service Member Affairs). See also S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 22 (2010) (“In addition to minorities and lower-income borrowers, military personnel are among
those whom are frequently exploited by auto dealers.”).
105. Id. § 5493(g) (establishing the Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans).
106. Id. § 5535(a) (requiring the Secretary of the Treasury to name a private education loan
ombudsman and listing the duties of the role).
107. Id. § 5493(c).
108. 12 U.S.C.§ 5494(b) (membership of the Consumer Advisory Board shall include experts on
“fair lending and civil rights”).
109. Id. § 5511(b)(2) (listing, among the CFPB’s objectives, that “consumers are protected from
unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices and from discrimination”). See also S. REP. NO. 111-176,
at 162 (citing “evidence of discriminatory pricing in the provision of auto loans, certain terms of mort-
gage loans, and other products” as a reason for creating the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportu-
nity).
110. Id. § 5493(d).
111. Id. § 5493(b)(1).
19
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• consumer behavior; and
• “experiences of traditionally underserved consumers . . . .”112
By itself, this is a remarkable statement of mission. Neither the Federal
Reserve Act nor the Federal Trade Commission Act, to take two examples
close to the CFPB’s DNA, require the relevant agency to conduct research,
much less research focusing on how people themselves experience and un-
derstand the regulated markets. Research relevant to risks to consumers is
highlighted; access, as an area of focus, is access to “fair and affordable
credit” for traditionally underserved communities. Everywhere, the con-
sumer experience—the reality of how consumers interact in the real world
with consumer financial products and services—is in the foreground. Em-
piricism trumps theory or ideology.113
The market monitoring function, which overlaps with the research
function, is supposed to inform rulemaking and other policymaking func-
tions.114 The market monitoring function, like the research mandate, was a
CFPB-specific innovation. The statute recognizes risks to consumers as
risks that the CFPB is specifically supposed to monitor and address. The
CFPB must “monitor for risks to consumers in the offering or provision of
consumer financial products or services . . . .”115 The statute then lists six
considerations the CFPB may take into account in conducting its monitor-
ing. In that context, the risks that “may disproportionately affect tradition-
ally underserved consumers” are identified as an appropriate focus of the
CFPB’s attention.116
In addition to the identification of research as a specific functional
unit, the statute identifies six other offices or functional units: community
affairs, tasked with “providing information, guidance, and technical assis-
tance” on traditionally underserved communities’ experiences with con-
sumer financial products and services;117 the consumer complaint function,
itself a sweeping new mandate intended to make visible to the agency, and
to Congress, consumers’ experiences with credit, in their own voices;118
112. Id.
113. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 162 (“The Committee expects these functions to ensure that the
Bureau has a robust knowledge of the markets for consumer financial products and services . . . .”).
114. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 165 (“The Committee considers the monitoring and information gather-
ing function to be an essential part of the Bureau’s work. The Bureau must stay closely attuned to the
marketplace for consumer financial products and services in order to effectively fulfill the purposes and
objectives of this title.”).
115. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(1).
116. Id. § 5512(c)(2)(E).
117. Id. § 5493(b)(2).
118. Id. § 5493(b)(3) (establishing the unit); 12 U.S.C. § 5534 (detailing the CFPB’s authority to
take complaints, including requiring “timely responses” by financial institutions). See S. REP. NO. 111-
176, at 162 (including the complaint function among those functions expected “to ensure that the Bureau
has a robust knowledge of the markets for consumer financial products and services”); Katherine M.
Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP.
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and the Offices for Fair Lending,119 Financial Education,120 Service Mem-
ber Affairs,121 and Older Americans.122 Each of these functional units is
tasked with “coordinating” with relevant state and federal agencies, and all
but the community affairs unit and the Office of Service Member Affairs
are tasked with providing reports to Congress. Each of the offices and units
has a different mandate, some more focused on education or supervision,
but each is expected to develop and communicate expertise on the exper-
iences and views of the communities called out for their focus.123 Under the
statute’s architecture, each office or unit is positioned to build relationships
with advocates and organizations interested in the needs of the community
it is working with and to serve as a conduit between those communities and
the CFPB, as well as other federal and state agencies.
In separate sections of the statute are the private education loan
ombudsman and the Consumer Advisory Board. The private education loan
ombudsman is also required to make annual reports to Congress, as well as
compile and analyze borrower complaints about private student loans.124
The Consumer Advisory Board is supposed to “advise and consult” on
how the CFPB exercises its functions.125 This echoes the language of the
Treasury white paper that saw the inclusion of a consumer advisory board
FIN. & COM. L. 57, 61 (2012) (The complaint function “was designed to give the CFPB a comprehen-
sive view of consumers’ frustrations to allow it to better perform its oversight of financial institutions.”).
119. Id. § 5493(c).
120. Id. § 5493(d).
121. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e).
122. Id. § 5493(g).
123. Id. § 5493(b)(2) (the community affairs unit shall “provid[e] information, guidance, and techni-
cal assistance regarding the offering and provision of consumer financial products or services to tradi-
tionally underserved consumers and communities”); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(C) (requiring an annual
report to Congress on the consumer complaints); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c)(2)(B), (C), (D) (suggesting that
the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity coordinate fair lending efforts with other governmen-
tal agencies, work with the private sector and advocates to “promot[e] . . . fair lending compliance and
education,” and provide annual reports to Congress); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(d)(2), (3) (requiring the Office of
Financial Education to “develop and implement a strategy to improve the financial literacy of consumers
. . . in consultation with the Financial Literacy and Education Commission” and to coordinate with both
the “Community Affairs Office” and the “research unit” in implementing the strategy and conducting
research); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(e)(1) (requiring the Office of Service Member Affairs to coordinate on
complaint monitoring by “service members and their families” and coordinating governmental consumer
protection work as it impacts service members and their families); 12 U.S.C. § 5493(g)(3) (requiring the
Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans to “develop goals” for programs serving “seniors,”
monitor certifications of financial advisors for seniors and alert other governmental entities of unfair,
deceptive or abusive practices, provide recommendations to Congress, conduct research, coordinate con-
sumer protection, and work with nonprofits assisting seniors); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 162
(noting that the “Bureau functional units for research, community affairs, and consumer complaints” are
meant “to ensure that the Bureau has a robust knowledge of the markets for consumer financial products
and services”).
124. 12 U.S.C. § 5535.
125. Id. § 5494(a).
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as an important step in “accountability” for the agency.126 Its members are
to include “representatives of communities that have been significantly im-
pacted by higher-priced mortgage loans” as well as experts in fair lending,
civil rights, and consumer protection.127 The Senate Report on Dodd-Frank
stressed the importance of appointing members “with a broad spectrum of
perspectives” and without regard to party affiliation. The Senate Report
noted that politicizing the Consumer Advisory Board would “jeopardize” its
work.128
Taken as a whole, the focus on low-income communities and commu-
nities of color is unavoidable. The evolving usage of “underserved,” from
Gale Cincotta’s organizing in the early 1970s, to the creation of the CDFI
Fund and the GSE Affordable Housing Goals in the 1990s, to Dodd-Frank
in 2010, all recognized the relationship between race and financial exclu-
sion. The passage of Dodd-Frank in the wake of the foreclosure tsunami
made the general racial justice focus unmistakable. Subprime lending and
foreclosures were disproportionately concentrated in communities of
color129 and led to dramatic drops in the absolute wealth of Black and His-
126. REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 60.
127. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b).
128. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 162.
129. See, e.g., Marsha J. Courchane, The Pricing of Home Mortgage Loans to Minority Borrowers:
How Much of the APR Differential Can We Explain?, 29 J. Real Estate Res. 399 (2007) (African Ameri-
cans more than two and a half times as likely and Hispanics roughly twice as likely as whites to receive
a subprime loan); Thomas P. Boehm, Paul D. Thistle, &Alan Schlottman, Rates and Race: An Analysis
of of Racial Disparities in Mortgage Rates, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 109, 126 (2006) (finding that
African Americans in the conventional market pay 20 basis points more for purchase loans and 94 basis
points more for refinances, and Latinos pay 12 basis points more for purchase loans, than whites with
similar income and education); First Nations Dev. Inst., Borrowing Trouble: Predatory Lending in Na-
tive Communities 14–16 (2008), https://perma.cc/YYJ3-PSRX (American Indians receive subprime
loans at roughly twice the rate whites do); Carsey Inst., Subprime and Prediatory Lending in Rural
America: Mortgage Lending Practices That Can Trap Low-Income Rural People, Pol’y Brief No. 4
(2006), https://perma.cc/SLQ3-WWAJ (rural Latinos, Native Americans, and African Americans all dis-
proportionately receive subprime loans, with African Americans nearly three times as likely as Whites
to receive subprime loan); Howell E. Jackson & Laurie Burlingame, Kickbacks or Compensation: The
Case of Yield Spread Premiums, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 289, 350 (2007) (Black and Latinx borrow-
ers pay more, on average, in broker compensation than whites); Robert B. Avery, Kenneth P. Brevoort
& Glenn B. Canner, Higher Priced Home Lending and the 2005 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. A123,
A157-A158 (2006) (pricing disparities between whites and minorities highest for broker originated
loans); Debbie Gruenstein Bocian, Keith S. Ernst & Wei Li, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Unfair Lend-
ing: The Effect of Race and Ethnicity on the Price of Subprime Mortgages 21–23 (May 31, 2006); Elvin
K. Wyly, Mona Atia, Holly Foxcroft, Daniel J. Hamme, Kelly Phillips Watts, American Home: Preda-
tory Mortgage Capital and Neighbourhood Spaces of Race and Class Exploitation in the United States,
88 GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER, SERIES B: HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 105 (2006); Binyamin Appelbaum & Ted
Mellnik, The Hard Truth in Lending, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, (Aug. 28, 2005), at 1A; Debbie Gruenstein
Bocian, Wei Li, & Keith S. Ernst, Ctr. For Responsible Lending, Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicitiy,
(June 18, 2010); Ira Goldstein, Subprime Lending, Mortgage Foreclosures, and Race: How Far Have
We Come and How Far Have We To Go?, THE REINVESTMENT FUND (2008), https://perma.cc/RUL4-
RHZZ.
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panic households.130 To include the voices of communities impacted by
higher-priced mortgage lending meant to include representatives of Black
and Hispanic communities. The racial and economic disparities in access to
banking services, with people of color and lower-income households, across
racial and ethnic lines, disproportionately numbering among the un-
derbanked and unbanked, were well-established and undisputed.131
The language of “traditionally underserved” is broad enough to permit
inclusivity and evolution but pointed enough to be clear. Congress wove
that history through its creation of the structure and function of the CFPB,
placing at the heart of CFPB’s mandated structure a mission of accountabil-
ity to racial and economic justice. The CFPB must pay attention to the
voices and experiences of Black and Brown communities, of low-income
communities, and of communities with particular vulnerabilities, such as
older Americans and service members. Congress envisioned the CFPB to be
accountable to these specific communities. Congress did not, however, tell
the CFPB how to ensure that accountability or even much about how to
incorporate the perspectives, experiences, and voices of those communities
in the CFPB’s policymaking work.
C. Building the Plane While Flying It
1. Early Organizational Decisions
Anyone who worked at the CFPB during its early years heard and
likely used, even if ironically, the Silicon Valley, entrepreneurial cliché132
“building the plane while flying it.”133 There was a prodigious amount of
130. See, e.g., Nathalie Baptiste, Staggering Loss of Black Wealth Due to Subprime Scandal Contin-
ues Unabated, THE AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 13, 2014); Wolff, supra note 29; Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony
Cilluffo, How Wealth Inequality Has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity
& Income, PEW RESEARCH CTR., Nov. 1, 2017, https://perma.cc/C3UY-7Q5E; Kriston McIntosh, Emily
Moss, Ryan Nunn, & Jay Shambaugh, Examining the Black-white wealth gap, BROOKINGS, (Feb. 27,
2020), https://perma.cc/3CKT-UBR6.
131. See, e.g., Nat’l Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, FDIC at 11 (Dec. 2009),
https://perma.cc/GS43-MGQ9 (finding that a majority of Black, 44.5% of American Indian and Alaskan
Native, and 43.3% of Hispanic households were either underbanked or unbanked, and that close to 20%
of lower-income households lacked any bank account); see also How America Banks: Household Use of
Banking and Financial Services, FDIC at 1-2 (Oct. 2020), https://perma.cc/L7MA-UY5L (“Consistent
with the results of previous surveys, in 2019 unbanked rates varied considerably across the U.S. popula-
tion. For example, unbanked rates were higher among lower-income households, less-educated house-
holds, Black households, Hispanic households, American Indian or Alaska Native households, working-
age disabled households, and households with volatile income.”).
132. See, e.g., Ruth Walker, ‘Build the Plane While You’re Flying It;’ A look at Why a Nonsensical
Idiom Beloved in Silicon Valley Has Caught on so Among the Rest of Us, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR
(Mar. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/B68W-LU7Z.
133. See, e.g., Cliff Rosenthal, My Life on the Dark Side, AM. BANKER (Dec. 15, 2014, 12:00 PM
EST), https://perma.cc/R94G-LKE5 (“The mantra we heard went like this: ‘We’re trying to fly the plane
while we’re building it.’”).
23
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work to do,134 from locating headquarters and furnishing them to staffing
up an agency to meeting statutory deadlines for Dodd-Frank Act rulemak-
ing.135 Initial staffing was done in just ten months.136 The early CFPB pul-
led from several existing agencies, including the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, the Federal Reserve Board, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the National
Credit Union Administration, the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, all with their own cultures and
norms.137 Added in were academics, former Hill staffers, and financial in-
dustry insiders from Wall Street, as well as both big and small financial
institutions.138 Each group, and subgroup, had their own internalized as-
sumptions about what a functioning organization could and should look
like.139
Dodd-Frank, as discussed above,140 mandated certain functional units,
a consumer complaint function, and regular reports to Congress on a variety
of topics, as well as setting a research and market monitoring agenda. But
there was plenty of room to adjust. Where should the private loan
ombudsman sit, for example, and what staff, if any, would that person
have? Only some of the mandated structures were called “offices” with
134. See, e.g., DePillis, supra note 42 (“New recruits would show up to no desk, no phone and way
too much to do.”).
135. Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act provided, for many of its mandated mortgage rulemakings,
that, if final rules were not issued 18 months after the transfer date, the statute would take effect as
written without the benefit of regulatory implementation. Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1400(c), 124 Stat.
2136. The statute granted authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the heads of
other agencies, to designate a transfer date from six to 18 months after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank
Act. 12 U.S.C. § 5582(c). On September 2, 2010, the Secretary of the Treasury published a Federal
Register notice designating July 21, 2011, as the transfer date. Designated Transfer Date, 75 Fed. Reg.
57252 (Sept. 2, 2010). See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 133 (“My colleagues worked hard, sometimes
insanely so, to produce regulations and research in time for statutory deadlines.”). DePillis, supra note
42 (noting that the CFPB established “a record of hitting each rulemaking deadline set by Dodd-Frank as
it fundamentally reshaped the mortgage market, while other agencies let theirs slide”).
136. See Emily Stewart, Elizabeth Warren Has Just One Plan, VOX (Sept. 19, 2019, 8:30 AM EDT),
https://perma.cc/3UB2-RGJH.
137. Dodd-Frank provided for the transfer of consumer financial protection functions and personnel
from these agencies. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5581, 5583. The Treasury white paper premised the rapid startup of
what would become the CFPB on transferring “reasonably quickly” core personnel from other federal
agencies. In what seems in hindsight to be a significant understatement, the Treasury white paper noted,
“Combining staff from different agencies is not simple, to be sure . . . .” REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPER-
VISION AND REGULATION (2010), supra note 23, at 57. See also DePillis, supra note 42 (“[T]he larger
issues [in integrating staff from other agencies] were cultural.”).
138. See Lachlan Markay, Elizabeth Warren Built the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. It
Became a Revolving Door, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 9, 2019, 5:19 AM EST), https://perma.cc/2J89-QPEK.
139. See DePillis, supra note 42 (“[I]ts strong-willed staff, drawn from other agencies, private com-
panies and consumer advocacy groups, got bogged down in constant fights over the mission.”); Stewart,
supra note 136 (“‘There was this old Washington versus 21st century agency culture clash,’ said Lean-
dra English.”).
140. See II.B.3, supra.
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mandated heads of “Assistant Director.” Nor did the statute make clear
where “Assistant Directors” should fit in the overall hierarchy. Clearly an
“Assistant Director” was below the Director and Deputy Director called for
in the statute, but the rest was all up to the agency.
Early CFPB leaders settled on six “Divisions,” led by “Associate Di-
rectors.”141 The specific offices and units mandated by the statute were
housed within these larger divisions, with the statute’s “Assistant Directors”
reporting to Associate Directors. The grouping of the statutory offices and
units into divisions communicated important decisions about how the CFPB
would do its work.
Consumer Education and Engagement housed the statutory offices fo-
cused on specific populations, as well as the Office of Financial Educa-
tion.142 Having a whole division focused on work directly with consumers
demonstrated a commitment by early CFPB leadership to place engagement
with consumers on a par in importance and focus with supervision and en-
forcement or research and regulations. Moreover, the inclusion of the spe-
cific population offices with the Office of Financial Education suggested a
view of consumer education as participatory and anchored in the specific
experiences of discrete populations.143
Similarly, housing supervision, enforcement, and the statutorily-man-
dated office of fair lending within the same division was a strategic
choice.144 Combining enforcement and supervision in the same agency was
a departure from existing norms of other regulators, and CFPB leadership
doubled down on that aspect of the statute by combining the two functions
in the same division. This suggested to many that supervisory oversight
would serve enforcement, at least in part, and that examiners might have a
more adversarial role with the institutions they supervised.145 Fair lending
would be part of the CFPB’s work overseeing financial institutions, and the
141. CFPB 2011 Semi-Annual Report, 12, https://perma.cc/2JKW-EDVQ [hereinafter CFPB 2011
Semi-Annual Report]; CFPB 2013 Semi-Annual Report, 143, https://perma.cc/J3VU-Y48C [hereinafter
CFPB 2013 Semi-Annual Report].
142. CFPB 2013 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 141, at 43–54 (describing the Offices of Financial
Education and the “special populations” offices housed in the Consumer Education and Engagement
division).
143. See, e.g., id. at 43 (“Reaching out to consumers is essential to the work of this division . . .
These . . . opportunities to hear directly from consumers about their financial needs, aspirations, and
experiences help inform all of the Bureau’s work.”).
144. See, e.g., CFPB 2011 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 141, at 9, 25 (“The CFPB’s Supervision,
Enforcement, and Fair Lending & Equal Opportunity Division promotes compliance with consumer
financial protection laws under the Bureau’s authority.”).
145. DePillis, supra note 42 (“One of bureau’s three major divisions, ‘Supervision, Enforcement,
and Fair Lending’ is a mix of the litigious culture of the Federal Trade Commission, which relies on
prosecuting wrongdoers, and the more observational approach of the Fed, which could always revoke a
bank’s charter if it found anything amiss.”); Alan Zibel, Consumer Regulator to Stop Bringing Lawyers
to Firm Exams, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 9, 2013, 6:33 pm ET) (“‘Supervision examiners and enforcement
25
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CFPB would explicitly focus its fair lending efforts on supervision and en-
forcement, rather than, say, “the promotion of fair lending . . . educa-
tion.”146
The CFPB’s organizational structure left unaddressed what input the
various statutory units, offices, and functions, other than the Office of Re-
search, would have into the development of policy in regulations. Practi-
cally, almost anyone from any office was given a voice in the CFPB’s early
policymaking.147 But, on the organizational chart, there was no clear line
from the offices and functions that, under the statute, had a special focus on
marginalized communities to the division, Research, Markets, and Regula-
tions, charged with developing the rules that govern the consumer financial
marketplace. Staff were left to negotiate input rights and equities largely on
an ad hoc basis.148 This left as undetermined and variable the weight to be
given the voices of marginalized communities, whether expressed by CAB
members from communities affected by higher-priced mortgage lending149
or by the Office of Community Affairs, charged with providing technical
assistance on credit in traditionally underserved communities.150 Both the
statute and the early organizational chart were silent on what weight should
be given consumer complaints in determining policy,151 even though ac-
cepting consumer complaints and requiring companies to respond to them is
one of the CFPB’s “primary functions.”152 This organizational lacunae,
attorneys will continue to work closely to ensure that the financial institutions that we oversee are
following the rules.’”).
146. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(c) (2011). See CFPB 2011 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 141, at 10 (“Fair
Lending & Equal Opportunity leads the Bureau’s efforts to ensure fair, equitable, and nondiscriminatory
access to credit for individuals and communities through supervisory oversight and enforcement of
federal fair lending laws, outreach, education, and engagement.”). The statutory language would later be
used to justify a restructuring that downplayed the importance of fair lending in enforcement and super-
vision. See III.C, infra.
147. See, e.g., DePillis, supra note 42 (“Everything had to come before a Thursday morning policy
committee and be vetted through working groups with staff from other divisions . . . . ‘Everybody was
weighing in on everybody’s business . . .,’ said one former Fed staffer . . . .”); see generally II.C.3, infra.
148. See, e.g., DePillis, supra note 42 (“‘There wasn’t even consensus about whether we were to
achieve consensus.’”).
149. 12 U.S.C. §5494(b). Note as well that the statute identifies “representatives of depository insti-
tutions that primarily serve underserved communities” as another group to be included in the CAB, and
that these representatives would also be well-suited to speak to specific financial concerns of “under-
served communities.”
150. Id. §5493(b)(2).
151. Acting Director Mick Mulvaney would place great emphasis on the number of debt collection
complaints in prioritizing enforcement regarding debt collection and rulemaking on debt collection prac-
tices over rulemaking on other matters, including prepaid cards and payday lending. See Yuka Hayashi,
CFPB to Work with FTC on Policing Debt Collectors: Some Republicans have called for merging
CFPB’s enforcement authority into FTC’s, citing overlap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2018 7:09 PM ET);
Mick Mulvaney, The CFPB Has Pushed Its Last Envelope, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2018 7:40 pm ET).
152. 12 U.S.C. §5511(c)(2).
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coupled with a lack of clear processes for input across the organization,
would contribute to the CFPB’s missteps during COVID.
2. Research and Market Monitoring
Placing the research unit into a division with the market monitoring
function so central to Congress’s conception of the CFPB,153 and joining
them both to the rulewriting function shaped how the CFPB made policy.
Grouping the statutorily-mandated “unit” of research with markets, teams,
and rulewriters in a single division signaled a commitment to data-driven
policy and integration of diverse professional perspectives into every stage
of the rulemaking process.154 From the beginning of every rule, the econo-
mists, lawyers, and market specialists (who came from a range of profes-
sional backgrounds but usually had significant experience working for or
with consumer financial products or service providers) were expected to
talk to each other. This organizational choice also influenced how both the
markets teams and the researchers thought of their work and what they did.
This organizational choice expanded significantly the responsibilities
of the Office of Research. In addition to issuing reports on the topic areas
mandated by Dodd-Frank, which heavily emphasized the experience of tra-
ditionally underserved communities, research was now responsible for help-
ing scope every rule. The responsibility to write “the 1022,” the description
of the costs and benefits of the rule mandated by section 1022(b)(2) of
Dodd-Frank, fell to the Office of Research, as did the mandated five-year
lookback, or “assessment,” of every significant rule issued by the CFPB.155
The 1022s and the assessments were large, intellectually ambitious projects,
particularly in the early days.156
Most executive agencies are required to conduct a cost-benefit analy-
sis, overseen by the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”), under
Executive Order 12,866.157 Independent agencies, including the CFPB and
most federal financial regulators, are exempt from direct OMB oversight in
their assessments of the effectiveness of their rules and not required to fol-
153. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 162 (2010).
154. Cf. DePillis, supra note 42 (“‘Research, Markets, and Regulation,’ blended academically
minded behavioral economists with lawyers. A clash of philosophies was inevitable.”).
155. 12 U.S.C. §5512(d).
156. See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-158, DODD-FRANK REGULA-
TIONS: CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU NEEDS A SYSTEMATIC PROCESS TO PRIORITIZE CON-
SUMER RISKS 18–24 (2018) (describing the CFPB’s assessments to date and process for scoping the
assessments).
157. The President, Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
(Oct. 4, 1993). See also The President, Exec. Order No. 13,563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
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low Executive Order 12,866. 158 Nonetheless, most do follow the OMB
guidance, at least in spirit and court challenges to rulemakings frequently
focus on how administrative agencies perform cost-benefit analyses where
required by law or internal procedure.159
An initial task for the CFPB was how to implement Dodd-Frank’s par-
ticularized approach to cost-benefit analysis. Dodd-Frank imposes special
statutory considerations for assessing the effectiveness of the CFPB’s
rules.160 Costs to consumers, as well as to financial institutions and other
entities covered by the rules, must be identified.161 The CFPB is told to
consider “potential reduction of access by consumers to consumer financial
products and services.”162 No guidance is given as to how to measure bene-
fits to consumers, or whether to treat all access equally. Impacts on rural
consumers are called out for special attention,163 but the CFPB is not told to
consider “traditionally underserved communities” or other specific popula-
tions beyond consumers in rural areas.
Implementing Dodd-Frank’s particularized approach to cost-benefit
analysis for the CFPB had to be done before any rules could be finalized.
Given the statutory deadlines for several major Dodd-Frank rulemakings
within just 18 months after the transfer date,164 this foundational work had
to be done as the agency was being stood up and while the first major rules
were being written. As a result, although the Office of Research conducted
important studies during the CFPB’s early years,165 the Office of Research
necessarily had less attention for its core statutory research agenda. Re-
158. The President, Exec. Order No. 12,866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735
(Oct. 4, 1993). Section 3(b) of Executive Order 12866 defines an “agency” as in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1),
excluding independent regulatory agencies. 44 U.S.C. 3502(5) was amended by Dodd-Frank to include
the CFPB. See Ryan Rainey, CFPB’s Cost-Benefit Analysis Office to Be Modeled after FTC’s Bureau of
Economics, MORNING CONSULT (May 10, 2018, 5:05 PM ET), https://perma.cc/7JMD-DFVC (“Specifi-
cally, the bureau is not required to submit its proposed rules to the Office of Information and Regulatory
Affairs, a unit of the Office of Management and Budget that’s charged with determining how rules
proposed by federal agencies would affect the U.S. economy.”). See generally Vivian S. Chu & Daniel
T. Shedd, Cong. Research Serv., Presidential Review of Independent Regulatory Commission Rulemak-
ing: Legal Issues (Sept. 10, 2012), https://perma.cc/HM27-Z9PU; Curtis W. Copeland, Economic Analy-
sis and Independent Regulatory Agencies 6–7 (Apr. 30, 2013), https://perma.cc/7DUT-9GQM.
159. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-151, DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS: IM-
PLEMENTATION COULD BENEFIT FROM ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND COORDINATION 12 (2011).
160. See Howell E. Jackson & Paul Rothstein, The Analysis of Benefits in Consumer Protection
Regulations, 9 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. 197, 223–27 (2019) (cataloging the CFPB’s legal requirements
regarding regulatory analysis).
161. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (2010). See Rainey, supra note 158.
162. Id,
163. Id. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(ii).
164. See supra note 135.
165. E.g., Kenneth P. Brevoort, Phillip Grimm & Michelle Kambara, Data Point: Credit Invisibles,
THE CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH (May 2015), https://perma.cc/B36G-29LM; Kenneth P. Brevoort &
Michelle Kambara, Data Point: Medical Debt and Credit Scores, THE CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH (May
2014), https://perma.cc/FPJ4-VT9U; Kathleen Burke, Jonathan Lanning, Jesse Leary, Jialan Wang,
28
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search attention needed to be directed on supporting rulemaking, from de-
signing the CFPB’s cost-benefit framework to conducting studies docu-
menting consumer harm in markets under consideration for regulation to
drafting the individual cost-benefit analyses.166
On the other hand, the CFPB’s addition of specialized markets teams
to the division of Research, Markets, and Regulations (“RMR”), expanded
and diversified available expertise and staff capacity for the research and
market monitoring functions. The markets teams varied in their back-
grounds, but they were often industry insiders with deep expertise in partic-
ular product and business lines, built up over decades of work in the various
markets. The markets teams prepared many of the required reports of “sig-
nificant findings” from market monitoring.167 Regular reports on credit
cards168 and debt collection169 were, for example, led by markets teams.
Including markets teams in RMR shaped policy development. The
markets teams’ knowledge of industry practices averted unintended conse-
quences and helped craft more effective and targeted regulation. Their en-
gagement in preparing some of the mandatory reports both lightened the
load of the Office of Research and ensured that those reports were appropri-
ately contextualized to the appropriate markets. Left underdeveloped, how-
ever, was a formal role in RMR’s policy development for expertise on the
impact of financial products on underserved communities.
3. Policy Development, Traditionally Underserved Communities, and
the Cordray-Era CFPB
Aside from weighing consumer benefits as part of the cost-benefit
analysis,170 there was no explicit, structural consumer-centric checkpoint in
rulemaking policy.171 Rulewriting teams did not have to prepare an analysis
CFPB Data Point: Payday Lending, THE CFPB OFFICE OF RESEARCH (March 2014), https://perma.cc/
H4BZ-7VYZ.
166. See Rainey, supra note 158.
167. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(3) (2010).
168. The Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosures Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-
24, 123 Stat. §1734 (2009) (requires the CFPB to prepare a biennial report). The first two CARD Act
reports, CARD Act Report: A Review of the Impact of the CARD Act on the Consumer Credit Card
Market, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Oct. 1, 2013), https://perma.cc/63LH-CLL8; The Consumer
Credit Card Market, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 2015), https://perma.cc/76HA-446R,
were led by staff from markets offices.
169. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires the CFPB to submit an annual report to Con-
gress on debt collection enforcement and compliance. 15 U.S.C. § 1692m(a). See, e.g., Fair Debt Col-
lection Practices Act: CFPB Annual Report 2013, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 20, 2013),
https://perma.cc/HGS9-KZE2.
170. 12 U.S.C. § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i).
171. Cf. DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 15 (“CFPB currently lacks a systematic,
bureau-wide process for prioritizing financial risks facing consumers . . . .”).
29
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of the impacts of their proposed regulations on traditionally underserved
communities, for example, despite the statute’s repeated mention of tradi-
tionally underserved consumers and communities.172 The markets offices
tended to focus on gathering information from financial institutions and
other businesses rather than consumers.173
The specific populations offices required by the statute were in differ-
ent divisions from the rulewriters and just one voice among many in the
CFPB’s policy development process.174 The Office of Fair Lending and
Equal Opportunity was in the supervision and enforcement division.175 The
complaint function, named “Consumer Response,” reported to the Associ-
ate Director for Operations.176 The Office of Community Affairs, tasked
with providing technical assistance on the needs and experiences of tradi-
tionally underserved communities, was housed in the External Affairs divi-
sion,177 but its statutory functions were largely carried out by the Office of
Financial Empowerment, in the division of Consumer Education and En-
gagement.178 And the offices for financial education, older Americans, ser-
vice members, and students were housed in the Consumer Education and
Engagement division.179 Some of these offices were quite lightly staffed;
none had a formal role in developing rulemaking policy.
Under the tenure of Director Cordray, the lack of a formal role did not
prevent any of these offices from engaging with the CFPB’s policymaking,
either in the rulewriting function or elsewhere in the agency. Policy devel-
opment was intentionally, sometimes exasperatingly, cross-matrixed.180
Teams on policy initiatives were often led by a manager from one office
172. See generally II.B.3, supra. Note that Dodd Frank requires consideration of the impact of its
regulations on “consumers in rural areas.” 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (b)(2)(A)(ii).
173. DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 9–10 (reporting an average of 50 meetings per
month with industry organizations and 4 meetings per month with consumer organizations during the
2018 fiscal year).
174. See II.C.1, supra. Cf. Cliff Rosenthal, My Life on the ‘Dark Side’, AM. BANKER (Dec. 15, 2014,
12:00 PM EST) https://perma.cc/Z8SA-5YMR (“The Office of Financial Empowerment was, of course,
only one office in the much larger bureau, whose defined mission was to serve all consumers; the
underserved were only one sector.”).
175. CFPB 2014 Semi-Annual Report, 187, https://perma.cc/9XJ5-PRLC [hereinafter CFPB 2014
Semi-Annual Report].
176. Id. at 59–60, 187.
177. Id. at 16, 187.
178. Id. at 71–74, 187.
179. See generally id. at 60–69, 187.
180. See, e.g., DePillis, supra note 42 (“Everything had to come before a Thursday morning policy
committee and be vetted through . . . staff from other divisions, on the theory that multiple perspectives
improve the final outcome. . . . ‘Everybody was weighing in on everybody’s business, which I really
think . . . bogs down the agency,’ said one former Fed staffer . . . .”); Cliff Rosenthal, My Life on the
‘Dark Side’, AM. BANKER (Dec. 15, 2014, 12:00 PM EST), (“The margins of my draft were filled with
comments from lawyers, economists, policy staff, communications staff and assorted others.”), https://
perma.cc/Z8SA-5YMR.
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with staff from other offices and even other divisions. On some initiatives,
such as the development of the TILA-RESPA integrated disclosures, teams
in different divisions would play different roles in the development of pol-
icy, forcing management and staff in different divisions to engage jointly on
policy decisionmaking.181 In 2015, the CFPB formalized this collaborative
approach to policy development in its “One Bureau” initiative, which
brought together subject matter experts from across the CFPB to set policy
priorities and design and develop policy initiatives.182
Nearly from the beginning, a central tool for the CFPB’s collaborative
approach was Policy Committee. Representatives from every office in the
CFPB were expected to attend weekly Policy Committee meetings and in-
vited to weigh in on policy matters great and small.183 Although the Policy
Committee had no formal decisionmaking role and was not attended by the
Director, teams would spend weeks preparing for Policy Committee meet-
ings with decks and slides. Objections raised during a Policy Committee
briefing could derail a proposal and require cross-division negotiations
before the matter proceeded to the Director for approval. In this cross-ma-
trixed environment, offices without a designated policy role in the CFPB’s
organizational chart, such as the Office of Community Affairs or the Office
of Older Americans, were able to raise concerns regarding the impact on
traditionally underserved communities and other groups of consumers, even
as the weight to give such input was constantly being re-negotiated by the
policymaking teams.
4. External Engagement with Traditionally Underserved Communities
Under Dodd-Frank, the CFPB was required to establish a CAB, for
information gathering and “advise and consult” purposes. The CFPB’s Di-
rector was instructed to:
seek to assemble experts in consumer protection, financial services, commu-
nity development, fair lending and civil rights, and consumer financial prod-
ucts or services and representatives of depository institutions that primarily
serve underserved communities, and representatives of communities that
have been significantly impacted by higher-priced mortgage loans, and seek
representation of the interests of covered persons and consumers.184
181. See, e.g., Leonard J. Kennedy, Patricia A. McCoy, & Ethan Bernstein, The Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for the Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141,
1160–67 (2012) (describing the “iterative, collaborative” development of the disclosure form).
182. DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 15–17.
183. See, e.g., DePillis, supra note 42 (“Everything had to come before a Thursday morning policy
committee. . . .”); ASR Analytics, Independent Performance Audit of CFPB Operations and Budget
(Nov. 13, 2012), https://perma.cc/5UYE-NWG, at 121 (noting that attendees at Policy Committee meet-
ings were “assistant directors and other key managers throughout the Bureau”)
184. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2010).
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Like the Federal Reserve Board’s Consumer Advisory Council,185 the
CFPB’s CAB initially provided for three-year staggered terms and drew
members from a wide range of backgrounds, including fair lending and
consumer protection advocates as well as academics and representatives of
financial institutions.186 Although its initial charter set the minimum num-
ber of members at 16,187 the first CAB had 25 members.188 The size, tenure,
and composition of the CAB would be changed under the CFPB’s next two
Directors.189
Arguably, some of the impact of the CAB in terms of foregrounding
the perspectives of marginalized communities was diluted by the creation of
two additional, extra-statutory advisory bodies: the Community Bank Advi-
sory Council (15-20 members) and the Credit Union Advisory Council (15-
20 members).190 Because the CAB, by statute, also included “financial ser-
vices” experts and “representatives of depository institutions,”191 this meant
that representatives of banks and credit unions had more formal representa-
tion in the CFPB’s advisory councils than consumers or traditionally under-
served communities.192
Although staff met with members of all three advisory councils, there
was not a formal mechanism with either the CAB or the two advisory coun-
cils for providing input into the CFPB’s policymaking. What the statute
meant by “advise and consult” remained largely unelucidated and left to
individual CAB members and staff to flesh out. As a result, using input
from the CAB was optional, not mandatory.
185. See, e.g., Consumer Advisory Council: Solicitation of Nominations for Membership, 66 Fed.
Reg. 29,806 June 1, 2001) (noting the three-year staggered terms) [hereinafter Solicitation of Nomina-
tions for Membership]. See also Equal Credit Opportunity Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
239 (1976) § 3 (amending 15 USC 1691b to require the Consumer Advisory Council).
186. Compare, e.g., Consumer Advisory Council, supra note 185 (listing council members, whose
employers included consumer advocacy organizations, housing counselors, banks, among others) with
CFPB Announces Consumer Advisory Board Members (Sept. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/7Y4Q-SL4N
(announcing the formation of the first CAB, with staggered three-year terms; noting that, “The newly
appointed board members include experts in consumer protection, financial services, community devel-
opment, fair lending, civil rights, and consumer financial products or services. They also represent de-
pository institutions that primarily serve underserved communities, and they represent communities that
have been significantly impacted by higher-priced mortgage loans.”).
187. Charter of the Consumer Advisory Board, at §5(b) (May 10 2012), https://perma.cc/9CRP-
TBDX.
188. CFPB Announces Consumer Advisory Board Members, supra note 186.
189. See, e.g., Renae Merle, Mick Mulvaney fires all 25 members of consumer watchdog’s advisory
board, WASH. POST, June 6, 2018 at 5:32 pm EDT; John Nancarrow, Advisory Board Revamp, BLOOM-
BERG L. (Mar. 22, 2019, 6:01 am), https://perma.cc/36SH-LECC.
190. DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 10.
191. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2010).
192. Note, however, that the statute instructs the CFPB’s director to “seek” “representatives of de-
pository institutions that primarily serve underserved communities,” suggesting that even selected repre-
sentatives of financial institutions would nonetheless have a focus on underserved communities. 12
U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2010).
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Other, less formal mechanisms were established for gathering input
about consumers in general and marginalized communities in particular.193
Director Cordray had regular calls with legal services organizations from
around the country. Faith-based coalitions had regular meetings with Direc-
tor Cordray and CFPB staff, providing another avenue for hearing perspec-
tives other than those of regulated entities.194 Field hearings provided a
chance for people in local communities around the country to provide direct
input to the CFPB on a variety of consumer financial protection topics.195
All of these mechanisms were useful to staff, and all were unstructured
regarding the weight the input was given, or the manner and timing of inte-
grating the input into policymaking.196
III. A FOUNDATION OF SHIFTING SANDS
A. The Times, They Are A-Changing
The CFPB went through its first political transition in the fall of 2017.
Although Director Cordray still had slightly more than half a year remain-
ing in his term, he made the decision to step down.197 President Trump
selected the Office of Management and Budget Director “Mick” Mulvaney
as the Acting Director of the CFPB.198 Mulvaney was widely known for
calling the CFPB “a sick, sad” joke while he was in Congress,199 and Presi-
dent Trump seemed to agree with Mulvaney, tweeting that the CFPB was a
193. See, e.g., CFPB 2014 Semi-Annual Report, supra note 175, at 74–76 (describing CFPB out-
reach).
194. Carrie Harris, CBF Advocacy Leads Delegation to Meet with New Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau Director, CBF BLOG (Jan. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/TZ53-E2BB (noting two coalitions,
Faith for Just Lending and the Faith & Credit Roundtable, had a “strong relationship with Director
Cordray”).
195. See generally DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 10.
196. See generally id. at 9–10.
197. RICHARD CORDRAY, WATCHDOG: HOW PROTECTING CONSUMERS CAN SAVE OUR FAMILIES,
OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR DEMOCRACY 205 (2020). Director Cordray was confirmed by the Senate on
July 16, 2013. On the Nomination (Confirmation of Richard Cordray, of Ohio, to be Director, Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection) Roll Vote 174, 113th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 16, 2013), https://perma.cc/
CA7R-GZUZ. He was sworn in the following morning. Rucker, supra note 2. The Dodd-Frank Act
provides that the CFPB director has a five-year term. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c). See also Kate Berry, Dems:
CFPB’s Cordray Would Sue if Forced Out, AM. BANKER (Jan. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/C4EK-JYUD
(noting Cordray’s term would have expired in July 2018).
198. Mulvaney had been a Tea Party Republican congressional representative from South Carolina
and would go on to become President Trump’s acting Chief of Staff.
199. Emily Stewart, Mick Mulvaney Once Called the CFPB a “Sick, Sad” Joke. Now He Might be in
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“total disaster.”200 Mulvaney began splitting his time between the CFPB
and the OMB.201
Mulvaney was only at the CFPB for a year. In that time, he initiated a
roll back of CFPB rulemaking on payday loans and Home Mortgage Dis-
closure Act data, brought in political appointees to head most divisions,202
removed enforcement and supervisory authority from the Office of Fair
Lending and Equal Opportunity, and generally worked to shift the focus
from what he saw as over-zealous enforcement of unduly burdensome regu-
lations.203
Initial press coverage assumed the Trump administration was con-
fronting an agency “stacked with loyalists” that would not be “easy to
reshape.”204 Three years later, the organizational chart looked very differ-
ent. 205 Internal processes that promoted collaboration in prioritization had
been shelved. 206 Two divisions had been merged, 207 new offices created,
and reporting lines and position descriptions changed.208 Taken together,
the changes undermined the ability of the agency to step forward aggres-
sively during the COVID-19 pandemic and reduced the agency’s funda-
200. Patrick Rucker & Jeff Mason, U.S. consumer watchdog agency official sues to block Trump’s
pick, REUTERS (Nov. 26, 2017), https://perma.cc/7V3H-TP3G.
201. See generally Patricia A. McCoy, Inside Job: The Assault on the Structure of the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, 103 MINN. L.REV. 2543, 2574-79 (2019) (discussing the legal controversy
surrounding Mulvaney’s joint appointment as the OMB Director and the CFPB Acting Director).
202. See, e.g., Kelsey Ramı́rez, CFPB to Dramatically Reorganize Operational Structure, HOUSING
WIRE, (May 10, 2018 1:54 PM), https://perma.cc/9PS7-ALFX.
203. See, e.g., Mick Mulvaney, The CFPB Has Pushed Its Last Envelope, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23,
2018 7:40 pm ET).
204. Michael Gruenwald, Trump Wants to Dismantle Elizabeth Warren’s Agency. Good Luck with
That, POLITICO (DEC. 3, 2017) https://perma.cc/H24E-BXKG.
205. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, CFPB Emerges from Trump Storm Battered but Intact, BLOOMBERG
OPINION (Jan. 27, 2021 6:00 AM EST), https://perma.cc/WZR8-XSCH (“By the 2020 election, many of
the high-ranking civil servants had left.”). In January 2021, all but one division head had been hired
since Cordray left. If we compare the CFPB’s March 4, 2021, organizational chart, Bureau Structure,
CFPB (last updated Mar. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/82FY-C8L8, to the chart presented to Congress in
the last semi-annual report prepared under Director Cordray, for spring 2017, the only head of a division
that is the same is Mary McLeod, the CFPB’s General Counsel. CFPB Spring 2017 Semi-annual Report,
175, https://perma.cc/J82K-BVGW. Acting Director Mulvaney discontinued the CFPB’s practice of
making the organizational charts public in the Semi-Annual report, which impedes tracing organiza-
tional changes over time. See, e.g., Semi-annual report of the Bureau of Consumer Fin. Protection, (Apr.
2018), https://perma.cc/G4NV-VLVP. One can trace most of the hires through review of the CFPB’s
press releases announcing new executive and senior leadership hires. See, e.g., CFPB Announces Addi-
tions to Executive Team, (Nov. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/MU66-3F5Z.
206. See DODD-FRANK REGULATIONS, supra note 156, at 15.
207. The divisions of External Affairs and Consumer Education and Engagement have been merged
into a new division of Consumer Education and External Affairs. Compare https://perma.cc/8JY9-FJGM
with CFPB Spring 2017 Semi-annual Report, supra note 205, at 175.
208. Kate Muñoz, Where Did All the Statutory Offices Go?, CONSUMER RIGHTS REGULATORY EN-
GAGEMENT ADVOCACY PROJECT (Oct. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/G8RK-LGQ2.
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mental ability to pay attention to the voices of marginalized communi-
ties.209
B. Fair Lending Disappears
Within about two months of becoming the Acting Director, Mulvaney
stripped the Office of Fair Lending and Equal Opportunity, one of the statu-
torily mandated offices, of its decision rights and formal involvement in
supervision and enforcement matters.210 Although justified at the time as
promoting “efficiency and consistency,”211 it would be more than two years
before the CFPB would bring its next redlining case.212 This was the long-
est absence of fair lending referrals in the agency’s history.213
“Fair lending” stayed in the title of the division of Supervision, En-
forcement, and Fair Lending. But the CFPB’s public actions and statements
veered away from acknowledging either racial discrimination or the
CFPB’s obligation to address it directly and substantively. Under question-
ing in 2020, the Director defended the CFPB’s failure to bring fair lending
enforcement cases by suggesting that such enforcement work was no longer
necessary.214 The CFPB’s portal for homeowners and renters facing chal-
lenges as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic failed to advise homeowners
of their right to file a fair lending complaint if they believed their mortgage
209. One study found that, while financial restitution in response to complaints to the CFPB dropped
by 30% during the Trump administration, the financial restitution to “low-socioeconomic areas”
dropped particularly sharply, suggesting that even the complaint function failed to maximize inclusion
of marginalized communities. Charlotte Haendler & Rawley Z. Heimer, The Financial Restitution Gap
in Consumer Finance: Insights from Complaints Filed with the CFPB (Jan. 2021), https://perma.cc/
45F4-WBHC.
210. Renae Merle, Trump administration strips consumer watchdog office of enforcement powers in
lending discrimination cases, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2018, 3:40 PM MST), https://perma.cc/ZM2A-25PU.
211. Id. (reporting statement of Mulvaney spokesman John Czwartacki).
212. In July 2020, the CFPB filed its sole fair lending discrimination case under President Trump’s
appointees, Townstone Financial. Complaint, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Townstone Fin., Inc.,
No. 20-cv-04176 (N.D. Ill. Filed July 15, 2020), https://perma.cc/Z7AP-7FH4. See also Kate Berry,
Where Have All the CFPB Fair-Lending Cases Gone?, AM. BANKER (Dec. 16, 2019, 9:30 PM EST),
https://perma.cc/CYP9-XMKM (“But neither Kraninger, nor her predecessor, Mick Mulvaney, filed any
other orders or referred possible Equal Credit Opportunity Act violations to the Department of Justice in
the past two years.”). See generally, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-21-393, Fair Lending:
CFPB Needs to Assess the Impact of Recent Changes to Its Fair Lending Activitie (2021) (recom-
mending that the CFPB assess the extent to which the reorganization hampered fair lending enforce-
ment).
213. Kate Berry, Where Have All the CFPB Fair-Lending Cases Gone?, AM. BANKER (Dec. 16,
2019, 9:30 PM EST), https://perma.cc/CYP9-XMKM.
214. In testimony before the Senate Banking Committee, Director Kraninger suggested that the
CFPB’s failure to obtain redress for consumers in discrimination cases “could be read as a success of the
original enforcement actions.” The Consumer Financial Bureau’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress:
Hearing Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://
perma.cc/7RQV-Q8GP, at 26:40 minute mark.
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servicer had discriminated against them while flagging that renters could
complain to HUD regarding discrimination in rentals.215 A July 2020 CFPB
blog post on financial inclusion concluded by punting the CFPB’s responsi-
bility to address financial discrimination to financial institutions, describing
the CFPB’s role in addressing financial exclusion as “ensuring that finan-
cial companies know they have a responsibility to treat consumers fairly
and to eliminate discrimination.”216
In June 2020, the CFPB settled with Harbour Portfolio Advisors and
its affiliates for a total of $35,000 for Fair Credit Reporting Act viola-
tions.217 Harbour bought properties that had been foreclosed on during the
Great Recession and resold them, on often exorbitant terms that left its pri-
marily low-income and often Black “customers” “swimming in a sea of
debt.”218 Harbour had been sued before, including by the city of Cincin-
nati219 and the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, joined by the National Consumer
Law Center.220 Both suits settled. Harbour paid the City of Cincinnati
$125,000 and agreed to fix all the housing it was selling.221 The Atlanta
Legal Aid case, which included allegations of race-based discrimination,
settled for an undisclosed amount, but all sixteen of the plaintiff households
received some financial redress, including, for those homeowners still in the
home, reformation of the contracts reducing the overall payment obliga-
tions.222 Harbour’s practice bore, in many ways, an uncanny resemblance to
the abusive lending practices that had led to the Great Recession and Con-
gress’s creation of the CFPB. The CFPB settlement, however, provided no
relief for homeowners and failed to address Harbour’s discriminatory prac-
tices. This was a distinct turning away from the congressional mandate to
address and elevate fair lending concerns.
215. Under questioning from Senator Menendez, Director Kraninger sought to distinguish between
fair housing complaints under the Fair Housing Act, which the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment has jurisdiction over, and fair lending complaints under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
The Consumer Financial Bureau’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress: Hearing Before S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), available at https://perma.cc/ZX2F-V3D8, at
4:00 minute mark.
216. Kathleen L. Kraninger, The Bureau is taking action to build a more inclusive financial system,
CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (July 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/EVC8-8Y5B
217. Consent Order, In the Matter of Harbour Portfolios Advisors, et al., Case No. 2020-BCFP-0004
(June 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/5UX4-55G7.
218. Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Market for Fixer-Uppers Traps Low-Income Buy-
ers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/5ZQZ-7CFM.
219. James Leggate, ‘Predatory’ Property Investors Agree to Pay Cincinnati, Change Practices to
Settle Lawsuit, WCPO CINCINNATI (Mar. 28, 2018, updated Dec. 12, 2018, 2:08 PM), https://perma.cc/
VH9S-FBB5.
220. Second Amended Cmplt, Horne v. Harbour Portfolio VI, LP, No. 1:17-CV-954-RWS (June 15,
2017), https://perma.cc/E92W-Q42R.
221. Leggate, supra note 219.
222. General Predatory Lending Briefs, Reports & Press Releases, NAT. CONSUMER LAW CTR. (last
visited May 21, 2021) https://perma.cc/R988-P9UT.
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C. Research under Attack
1. Whose Cost and Whose Benefit?
The early CFPB boasted itself as a 21st century data-driven agency.223
Research was integrated into every rulemaking from initial scoping to final-
ization.224 Rulemakings were often proceeded by detailed research reports
investigating the nature of the market and the extent, if any, of consumer
harm.225 The CFPB’s Office of Research scrupulously sought to ground the
CFPB’s policymaking in empirical research, free from ideological or politi-
cal bias.226
The Trump administration seemed suspicious of this approach and
questioned the caliber, objectivity, and methodology of the work done by
the CFPB’s economists and researchers.227 Acting Director Mulvaney pro-
posed to create a separate office of cost benefit analysis.228 Unlike the ex-
isting Office of Research, housed with the markets teams and the
rulewriters in the division of RMR,229 the Office of Cost-Benefit Analysis
would have been in the Director’s office.230 The exact purpose and respon-
sibilities of such an office were not clear, but many observers assumed the
goal was to make cost-benefit analysis more subject to political control.231
Tensions between political appointees and the career economists flared
into view in April 2020 with the publication of a memo by a career econo-
223. Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 181, at 1160–67.
224. See generally II.C.2, supra.
225. See, e.g., Burke, Lanning, Learly & Wang, supra note 165.
226. See Kennedy, McCoy & Bernstein, supra note 181, at 1155.
227. Alan Rappeport, Mick Mulvaney Calls for ‘Humility’ from Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://perma.cc/EJQ6-KQAK. Mulvaney’s suggestion that rulemak-
ings should be driven by complaint data was at odds with what most observers believe can be credibly
deduced from complaints. See, e.g., Disclosure of Certain Credit Card Complaint Data, 76 Fed. Reg.
76,628, 76,630 (Dec. 8, 2011) (discussing limitations in drawing conclusions about provider quality and
consumer harm from the complaint data). Katherine M. Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on
the CFPB’s Complaint Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 57, 70–71, 80 (2012) (noting
complaint frequency can be generated by complex products, or vary depending on the effectiveness of
various companies’ internal complaint handling mechanisms, as well as the general “nonrandom” nature
of who complains; praising the CFPB for being “sensitive” to these concerns in its rulewriting) (“These
concerns reveal that the raw numbers of complaints have little meaning on their own.”) (noting that
marginalized consumers in particular “may be less likely to complain”).
228. See, e.g., Rainey, supra note 158.
229. CFPB Spring 2017 Semi-annual Report, supra note 205.
230. See, e.g., Rainey, supra note 158.
231. See, e.g., id. (quoting Sen. Warren as saying, “This redundant office, put directly under the
control of Mulvaney and his political staff, is designed to substitute political ideology for data driven
rulemaking.”); Ramı́rez, supra note 202 (quoting Rep. Maxine Waters, “The creation of an Office of
Cost Benefit Analysis, to be closely controlled within the Office of the Director, is nothing more than a
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mist detailing political meddling in the drafting of the cost-benefit analysis
on the notice of proposed rulemaking to rescind the 2017 payday rule’s
ability to repay protections. 232 Career staff were, according to the memo,
treated as “adversaries;” political appointees disregarded staff expertise and
sought revision of the rule on “philosophical” grounds rather than new or
updated research and data.233
The 2020 final payday rule rolled back the ability-to-repay protections
of the 2017 rule on the basis that the 2017 final rule would unduly constrain
consumer choice.234 It relied on the relatively low number of consumer
complaints about payday loans to dismiss the Bureau’s previous analyses
regarding evidence of consumer confusion.235 The CFPB specifically re-
fused to consider whether consumers taking out payday loans understood
their own chances of being caught in a debt trap (as they would presumably
need to do in order to be making an informed choice).236 Instead, the CFPB
relied on a legal and philosophical line-drawing exercise that deemed irrele-
vant individual consumers’ understanding about their individual circum-
stances.237 This was the opposite of being data-driven and showed a su-
preme indifference to the lived experiences of the marginalized, predomi-
nately Black, communities, whose wealth is too often drained by payday
lenders.238
2. Leaving Racial Disparities Unexamined
Dodd-Frank, as we have seen, mandated a specific research agenda
that included the risks to traditionally underserved communities and con-
sumers.239 Yet the Trump-era CFPB failed to use its prodigious research
232. Nicholas Confessore & Stacy Cowley, Trump Appointees Manipulated Agency’s Payday Lend-
ing Research, Ex-Staffer Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://perma.cc/T9KJ-BBEN.
233. The memo fueled public speculation about political contributions Mulvaney had received from
payday lenders and their trade associations while he was a congressional representative. See, e.g., Kate
Berry, Link Between Payday Campaign Cash & Lawmakers’ Votes, Report Claims, AM. BANKER (APR.
26, 2018, 3:53 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/J932-CAMK.
234. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 85 Fed. Reg. 44,382, 44,393
(July 22, 2020). Of course, people from marginalized communities are often underrepresented in com-
plaint databases, in part because they often suspect, too often correctly, that their complaints will be
ignored. See Katherine M. Porter, The Complaint Conundrum: Thoughts on the CFPB’s Complaint
Mechanism, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 80 (2012).
235. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, supra note 234, at 44,391.
236. Id. at 44,395.
237. Id.
238. Payday lending is overwhelmingly concentrated in Black neighborhoods. See, e.g., Uriah King,
Wei Li, Delvin Davis, & Keith Ernst, Race Matters: The Concentration of Payday Lenders in African-
American Neighborhoods in North Carolina, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Mar. 22, 2005), https://
perma.cc/RV85-DY23; Pew Charitable Trusts, Payday Lending in America: Who Borrows, Where They
Borrow, and Why (July 2012), https://perma.cc/VDE2-N8WS.
239. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(1) (2010). See II.B.3, supra.
38
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capabilities to illuminate racial disparities,240 even as the country went
through what many have called a racial reckoning in 2020.241 The lack of
data impeded work to advance racial and economic equity and hindered
work for financial inclusion.
Some of these failures, like the failure to advance the Dodd-Frank
mandated small business lending data collection,242 date back to decisions
made early in the CFPB’s existence. Work on that rulemaking had only
begun in earnest in 2016,243 leaving it vulnerable to being shelved under the
Trump administration.244 The CFPB’s failure to move forward with the
small business lending data collection rulemaking meant that data and re-
porting on small business lending was lacking when COVID-19 hit. The
lack of that data contributed to the widely documented failures of the
Paycheck Protection Program to deliver credit to small businesses owned
by people of color.245
240. See generally, Diane Thompson, CFPB, Show Your Work: The Case for Data-Driven Regula-
tion in the Time of COVID-19, MORNING CONSULT (June 10, 2020 at 5:00 am EST), https://perma.cc/
H4WF-LBB6.
241. See, e.g., Michele L. Norris, Don’t Call It a Racial Reckoning. The Race Toward Equality Has
Barely Begun, WASH. POST, (Dec. 18, 2020 at 1:41 pm EST), https://perma.cc/Y6CQ-W8P2 (arguing
that the term “racial reckoning” was overused in 2020 given the scale of remaining racial injustice).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2010). This amendment to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act was § 1071
of the Dodd-Frank Act, and so is commonly referred to as the 1071 rulemaking. The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. §1376 (2010). Small busi-
nesses can serve as powerful engines of wealth creation, particularly for African Americans, and access
to credit can mean the difference between success and failure. Add to that the idiosyncratic, opaque, and
highly discretionary nature of small business lending, and concerns about access to credit quickly multi-
ply. See generally CFPB, Key dimensions of the small business lending landscape (May 2017), https://
perma.cc/F7KW-M26X.
243. Kelly Cochran, Fall 2016 rulemaking agenda (Dec. 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/V52G-7QES
(“The Bureau is also in the very early stages of starting work to implement section 1071 of the Dodd-
Frank Act, which amends the Equal Credit Opportunity Act to require financial institutions to report
information concerning credit applications made by women-owned, minority-owned, and small busi-
nesses.”).
244. See Kelly Cochran, Fall 2018 rulemaking agenda (Oct. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/Q7R9-
F9EN (“The Bureau has now reclassified the section 1071 project from pre-rule status to longer-term
action status.”). The California Reinvestment Coalition, represented by Democracy Forward, sued the
CFPB to force reinstitution of small business lending data collection rulemaking. Cal. Reinvestment
Coalition v. Kraninger, 19-cv-02572, May 24, 2019 (N.D. Cal.).
245. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Minority Entrepreneurs Struggled to Get Small-Business Relief Loans,
N.Y. TIMES,(Apr. 4, 2021); Amanda Fischer, Did the Paycheck Protection Program work for small
businesses across the United States?, WASHINGTON CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH 4 (July 2020), https:/
/perma.cc/5DN7-58RV (discussing evidence showing that PPP loans did not go the hardest-hit areas);
Gregory Ugwi, Black-Owned Businesses Received Less than 2% of PPP Loans while White-Owned
Businesses Received 83%, THE BUSINESS OF BUSINESS (July 6, 2020, 7:09 PM) https://perma.cc/U236-
JFA6 (reporting that, based on the 14% of businesses that identified race in their loan application, of
those who received PPP loans, 1.9% were Black-owned and 7% were Hispanic-owned, far below their
proportional representation in the overall population).
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The Trump administration actively rolled back reporting under the
HMDA.246 The HMDA data collection had been expanded by Congress and
the Bureau in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis in recognition of the
importance of the mortgage market to the economy and to racial equity
issues in particular. Racial disparities in home mortgage lending drive much
of the racial wealth divide,247 and HMDA data is widely used to track racial
disparities in home mortgage lending.248 In 2020, the CFPB raised the num-
ber of closed-end mortgages a lender must make before it is mandated to
collect and report the HMDA data from 25 to 100.249 The new CFPB
threshold will exclude roughly one-third of all financial institutions that
make residential mortgages from required collection and reporting of data,
making it that much harder for policymakers to observe any racial dispari-
ties.250 At the same time, the CFPB signaled its interest in removing certain
new data points collected from lenders used to identify lending patterns by
racial subgroup.251 The National Coalition for Asian Pacific Americans
Community Development, among other advocacy groups,252 had pushed
hard for collection of data specific to racial subgroups, given the wide di-
versity of experiences across the communities labeled as “Asian Ameri-
can.”253
246. 85 Fed. Reg. 28,364 (May 12, 2020).
247. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 14–15 (using HMDA data to calculate racial disparities in
mortgage lending); Vicki Been, Ingrid Ellen, & Josiah Madar, The High Cost of Segregation: Exploring
Racial Disparities in High-Cost Lending, 36 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 361, 363 n. 2 (2009) (explaining
authors’ use of HMDA data to study racial disparities in subprime lending); Letter from Americans for
Financial Reform, et al., to Ren Essene, Manager, Policy Section of the Chief Data Officer, CFPB,
https://perma.cc/N7ZU-QJQF (discussing generally the importance of the HMDA data).
248. See, e.g., Alanna McCargo & Jung Hyun Choi, Closing the Gaps: Building Black Wealth
through Homeownership 7–10 (Nov. 2020), https://perma.cc/89CM-R385.
249. 85 Fed. Reg. 28,364 (May 12, 2020).
250. 85 Fed. Reg. 28,364, 28,393 (May 12, 2020) (estimating that about 1,700 institutions will no
longer report closed-end loans from about 4,860 current HMDA reporters or 34.9%).
251. Home Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C) Data Points and Coverage, 84 Fed. Reg. 20,049,
20,051 (May 8, 2019) (“[I]nstitutions are now required to request that the applicant self-identify their
ethnicity using disaggregated categories (e.g., Cuban or Mexican) and their race using disaggregated
categories (e.g., Chinese or Korean) . . . . Some financial institutions have stated that these new require-
ments can prolong and complicate the application process.”); Office of Information and Reg. Affairs,
Office of Management and Budget, Fall 2020 Unified Agenda and Regulatory Plan, CFPB, Home Mort-
gage Disclosure Act (Regulation C), https://perma.cc/574U-GWC6 (“The Bureau expects to issue a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in early 2021 to follow up on the May 2019 ANPRM.”).
252. Jason Richardson & Jad Edlebi, Preliminary Analysis of 2019 HMDA Mortgage Lending Data
(June 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/56A4-DUJJ (“2018 saw the introduction of ethnic and racial subgroups
to HMDA. This was a response to community advocacy from Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander
communities. These groups are not homogenous, and by grouping them together we can miss evidence
of excluded populations that are locked out of the mortgage system.”).
253. See, e.g., Letter from Lisa Hasegawa, Executive Director, National CAPACD, to Richard Cor-
dray, Director, CFPB, Comment on CFPB-2014-0019-0001 (Oct. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/D7VP-
4L36, (“The HMDA race and ethnicity data as currently reported has been ineffective in capturing the
varied experiences of AAPI borrowers.” “[W]e recommend that the reporting loan data should include:
40
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Against this backdrop, advocates were particularly concerned that the
CFPB, in its first reports analyzing the expanded HMDA data, stopped
short of conducting a full analysis of racial disparities.254 Due to privacy
concerns, only some of the HMDA data points are made publicly availa-
ble.255 Key factors relevant to mortgage pricing and availability, including
credit score, are available to researchers at the CFPB but not to the pub-
lic.256 Therefore, only the CFPB (and others who have access to the non-
public data) can determine whether those factors account for observed racial
disparities in pricing.257
In 2019 and 2020, the CFPB released its first analyses of the expanded
HMDA data. In both years, the researchers found that, even controlling for
credit score, Black and Hispanic borrowers were denied more often than
white borrowers.258 Unsurprisingly, the researchers also found that Black
and Hispanic borrowers pay more than white borrowers, across a wide
disaggregated data for Asian American and Pacific Islander borrowers.”). See also Seema Agnani &
Jason Richardson, Mortgage Lending in the Asian American and Pacific Islander Community, (Aug. 6,
2020), https://ncrc.org/mortgage-lending-in-the-asian-american-and-pacific-islander-community/ (using
disaggregated HMDA data to shows wide disparities in lending patterns across AAPI subgroups); Cy
Watsky, Josh Ishimatsu, Arika Harrison, & Emmanuel Nieves, The Economic Reality of the Asian
American Pacific Islander Community Is Marked by Diversity and Inequality, Not Universal Success,
https://perma.cc/TU42-9TR9;
254. See, e.g., Kelsey Ramı́rez, Consumer groups, CFPB clash over handling of HMDA data, HOUS-
INGWIRE, (Sept. 5, 2019, 5:47 pm) (“‘The way the CFPB is handling HMDA data is also alarming,’
NCRC CEO Jesse Van Tol said. ‘Without [detailed reporting from the CFPB], the general public is left
in the dark about the nation’s mortgage lending. It is just another example of how the Trump Adminis-
tration is working to hide public data . . . .’”).
255. See generally Disclosure of Loan-Level HMDA Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 649 (Jan. 31, 2019).
256. Disclosure of Loan-Level HMDA Data, 84 Fed. Reg. 649, 650 (Jan. 31, 2019). See also Letter
from Americans for Financial Reform, et al., to Ren Essene, Manager, Policy Section of the Chief Data
Officer, CFPB, https://perma.cc/87ZX-8YT8 (“[The credit score and debt-to-income ratio] are key to
identifying potential lending discrimination and understanding longstanding racial disparities in mort-
gage lending.”).
257. Feng Liu, Young Jo, Akaki Skhirtladze, & Laura Barriere, An Updated Review of the New and
Revised Data Points in HMDA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 50 (Aug. 2020) (“These new data make
it possible for users of non-public HMDA data to analyze denial rates and pricing differentials after
controlling for credit scores (and other variables discussed in this article).”), https://perma.cc/SY3B-
4TQ4.
258. Feng Liu, Jason Dietrich, Young Jo, Akaki Skhirtladze, Misha Davies & Corinne Cadilis, Intro-
ducing New & Revised Data Points in HMDA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 53–54 (Aug. 2019),
https://perma.cc/5C22-SWXW; Feng Liu, Young Jo, Akaki Skhirtladze, & Laura Barriere, An Updated
Review of the New and Revised Data Points in HMDA, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 70 (Aug. 2020),
https://perma.cc/SY3B-4TQ4. It is highly contested whether credit scores themselves are truly race neu-
tral and legitimate measures of credit risk. See, e.g., Michelle Singletary, Credit scores are supposed to
be race-neutral. That’s impossible, WASH. POST, (Oct. 16, 2020), https://perma.cc/839F-XT9D; Natalie
Campisi, From Inherent Racial Bias to Incorrect Data—The Problems with Current Credit Scoring
Modelsm FORBES (Feb. 26, 2021), https://perma.cc/BRK9-2G6U; Karan Kaul, Adopting Alternative
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range of mortgage products,259 but the CFPB did not analyze the pricing
disparity controlling for credit score.260 One national advocate character-
ized the CFPB’s release of HMDA data and public analysis as leaving “the
general public . . . in the dark.”261
Often, the research reports did address racial disparities, even as the
CFPB’s press releases ignored or downplayed the racial equity implications
of the research. For example, in July 2020, the CFPB released the first re-
sults from the Making Ends Meet survey.262 This survey noted that 64.9%
of surveyed African Americans, or nearly two-thirds, had trouble paying a
bill in the previous six month, compared to only 35% of whites. 263 Even
more striking is that the disparity between African Americans and whites
“persists even when controlling for income, age, gender, education, and ru-
ral status.”264 As the CFPB stated, “[B]eing African American significantly
predicts having difficulty even when income, rural status, age, education,
and gender are included. Being Hispanic did not significantly predict hav-
ing difficulty . . . .”265 The authors of the report surmised that lack of aver-
age net wealth has a compounding impact, meaning that African Americans
are less likely to have friends and family members who have money to lend,
and that they are nonetheless often called upon to help financially-strapped
family members and friends.266 Failing to even mention the racial dispari-
ties in the press release was, in July 2020, a glaring omission.
259. Liu, et al., supra note 258, at 68. Feng Liu, Young Jo, Akaki Skhirtladze, &; Laura Barriere, An
Updated Review of the New and Revised Data Points in HMDA, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau 222 (Aug.
2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_data-points_updated-review-hmda_re-
port.pdf.
260. In both 2019 and 2020, the CFPB pointed to “underlying credit characteristics” “such as credit
score, CLTV, choice of loan term, whether the loan has a fixed rate or adjustable rate, non-amortizing
features, lien status, occupancy status, and whether the borrowers have paid discount points or received
lender credits, etc.” as possible explanations of the differences in median interest rates across a wide-
range of mortgage products for Black and Hispanic borrowers compared to non-Hispanic whites. Liu et
al., supra note 258, at 70.; Liu, et al., supra note 257 (the introductory rate period is completed as “N/A”
for fixed-rate mortgages). All of these credit characteristics are in the HMDA data, although not all are
in the public HMDA data. See Filing Instructions Guide for HMDA Data Collected in 2019, OMB
Control #3170-0008, FFIEC (July 2019), https://perma.cc/5G7L-SPGA 16 (credit score, occupancy), 51
(lien status), 55(combined loan-to-value ratio, loan term, discount points, and lender credits), 56 (intro-
ductory rate period, non-amortizing features).
261. Ramı́rez, supra note 254 (“‘The way the CFPB is handling HMDA data is also alarming,’
NCRC CEO Jesse Van Tol said. ‘Without [detailed reporting from the CFPB], the general public is left
in the dark about the nation’s mortgage lending. It is just another example of how the Trump Adminis-
tration is working to hide public data . . . .”).
262. Scott Fulford & Marie Rush, Insights from the Making Ends Meet Survey, CFPB OFFICE OF
RESEARCH 5 (July 2020), https://perma.cc/62PM-MR7X.
263. Id. at 5.
264. Id. at 6.
265. Id. at 6 n. 9.
266. Id. at 6.
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D. The Coronavirus Failure
The CFPB lost significant opportunities to address the economic crisis
caused by the pandemic, in large part because the CFPB failed to engage in
precisely the data collection and market monitoring demanded by the Dodd-
Frank Act. Instead of focusing on the CFPB’s singular research and market
monitoring statutory mandates, the Director focused on consumer educa-
tion.267 Those materials were laudable. But they were not a sufficient re-
sponse to the COVID-19 crisis, and they neglected tools Congress had de-
liberately given the CFPB to equip it to address systemic crises facing con-
sumers and the national economy. The CFPB’s lack of real time data and
market monitoring undercut its ability to respond effectively to the COVID-
19 crisis and increased the risk that its interventions would be faulty.
1. Consumer Complaints
Early on in the pandemic, the CFPB’s director characterized com-
plaints to the CFPB as “a backstop.” 268 Still, the situations people found
themselves in were dire, and consumer complaints to the CFPB skyrocketed
in March.269 Complaints continued to climb throughout 2020. 270
The increase in volume was driven mostly by complaints about credit
reporting.271 Over the course of 2020, complaints to the CFPB about credit
reporting more than doubled.272 Advocates repeatedly pointed to the in-
267. The Consumer Financial Bureau’s Semi-Annual Report to Congress: Hearing Before S. Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 116th Cong. (2020), https://perma.cc/FGU7-8VBE, at 15:15
minute mark. For a brief discussion of what the CFPB could and should have done to contain the crisis,
see Richard Cordray, Diane E. Thompson & Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection in
the COVID-19 Crisis: An Emergency Agenda, U. PENN. L. REV. BLOG (last visited Feb. 7, 2021), https://
perma.cc/C47W-EY3F. See also Craig Cowie, Is the CFPB Still on the Beat? The CFPB’s
(Non)Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 82 MONT. L. REV. 41 (2021).
268. Kathleen L. Kraninger, Director Kraninger Remarks During the Fin. Stability Oversight Coun-
cil Meeting, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 26, 2020), https://perma.cc/WZL5-U4Q3.
269. Andrew Keshner, Consumer Complaints to the CFPB Are Skyrocketing as the Coronavirus
Outbreak Continues, MARKETWATCH (July 19, 2020, 6:58 AM ET), https://perma.cc/F6ES-B85T; U.S.
PIRG, Analysis of CFPB Consumer Complaints March-April 2020, (May 2020), https://perma.cc/
RN5Q-VYEE.
270. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER RESPONSE ANNUAL REPORT, JANUARY 1 – DECEM-
BER 31, 2020 at 9, https://perma.cc/G58Z-Z9X3 [hereinafter 2020 CFPB Annual Report].
271. Id. The CFPB reports credit and consumer reporting together. Consumer reporting includes
background checks and employment screening. Of the complaints for which the company acknowledged
a commercial relationship with the consumer, there were only 1,600 complaints about consumer reports
compared to 279,200 about credit reporting. 2020 CFPB Annual Report, supra note 270. See also U.S.
PIRG, Analysis: CFPB Complaints Surge During Pandemic, Led by Credit Report Complaints, (Aug.
2020), https://perma.cc/4Y3A-HFFT.
272. 2020 CFPB Annual Report, supra note 270 (credit reporting complaints increased by 129%
over the course of 2020); Ann Carns, More Consumers Complain About Errors on Their Credit Reports,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2021. Complaints about credit reporting had been increasing before the pandemic.
Beginning in 2017, the CFPB had allowed consumers to complain against all three of the national credit
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creasing volume of credit reporting complaints as a rebuke to the CFPB’s
relaxation of rules273 governing timelines for responding to disputes of
credit reporting accuracy, suggesting that attention to the data would likely
have led to a different regulatory intervention.274 Consumers with com-
plaints about credit reporting received financial restitution well below all
other categories, other than debt collection, with a larger percentage of
complaints about credit reporting being closed with only an explanation
than any other category.275
Complaint volume increased in other categories as well, most dramati-
cally for prepaid cards,276 which also saw a doubling in complaints over
2020.277 Sixty-three percent of the complaints about prepaid cards were
about government benefits cards,278 including the prepaid cards issued to
consumers for payment of stimulus funds.279 The leading complaint about
the prepaid cards for stimulus funds and unemployment benefits was a fail-
reporting agencies at once, 2020 CFPB Annual Report, supra note 270, at 21, 23. As this change in the
complaint process occurred in 2017, it is implausible that it accounts for the doubling of complaints in
2020.
273. Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and Regulation V in Light of the CARES Act, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 1, 2020), https://
perma.cc/EE67-5EQYpdf (relaxing timing requirements for investigations of credit reporting disputes).
274. See, e.g., Letter from Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., et al.to David Uejio, Acting Director, CFPB
(Mar. 25, 2021), https://perma.cc/3HV7-7MV5; Ann Carns, More Consumers Complain About Errors
on Their Credit Reports, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2021 (quoting Chi Chi Wu of the National Consumer
Law Center as saying that “mistakes are an even bigger worry during the pandemic” and that “[d]isputes
have not been responded to, or have taken an excessive amount of time”); Letter from Nat’l Consumer
L. Ctr., et al. to Kathleen L. Kraninger, Director, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 24, 2020), https:/
/perma.cc/HDK6-3H9T; Press Release, National Consumer L. Ctr., National Consumer Law Center Ad-
vocate Slams Trump Administration Credit Reporting Guidance for Giving Relief to Creditors and
Credit Bureaus But Not Consumers During COVID-19 Pandemic, Apr. 1, 2020, (“The CFPB’s guidance
does not provide one iota of assistance to consumers . . . . Instead, the CFPB provides a helping hand to
. . .credit bureaus, . . . the number one source of complaints to the CFPB’s . . . Complaint Database.
This. . . will make it much more difficult for [consumers] to recover financially for many years to
come,” quoting Chi Chi Wu).
275. Less than 1% of all credit and consumer reporting and debt collection complaints received
monetary relief, while 91% of credit and consumer reporting complaints were closed with only an expla-
nation. By comparison, in 2020, 3% of all complaints resulted in monetary relief. 2020 CFPB Annual
Report, supra note 270, at 17. Given that many complaints are likely to be about accuracy disputes, it is
perhaps not surprising that so few of the complaints resolved with monetary relief, although the percent-
age of complaints closed with non-monetary relief, also lags both the overall rate (6%) and the debt
collection specific rate (9%).
276. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT BULLETIN, COMPLAINTS MENTIONING
CORONAVIRUS KEYWORDS at 7 (July 2020), https://perma.cc/LXA3-3GJU [hereinafter COMPLAINT BUL-
LETIN JULY 2020] (“Comparing the weekly average complaint volume before and after the emergency
declaration, shows that prepaid card complaints saw the greatest percent increase . . . .”).
277. 2020 CFPB Annual Report, supra note 270, at 23.
278. Id. at 70.
279. Id. at 71.
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ure to receive the card in a timely way.280 Prepaid companies were also
among the slowest to respond to complaints filed with the CFPB, failing to
provide timely responses 8% of the time.281 Given the scale of the crisis, it
may have been too much to hope that the CFPB’s rulemaking to enable the
payment of government benefits on prepaid cards282 would, as promised,
result in “the fast, secure, and efficient” delivery of stimulus funds to con-
sumers,283 but the gap between the rulemaking’s promise and consumer
reality as evidenced in the CFPB’s own complaint database was sobering.
Throughout 2020, the CFPB issued only two reports on the complaint
data,284 not counting the annual report on the complaint data required by
Dodd-Frank.285 By contrast, until 2018, the CFPB issued monthly reports
analyzing complaint data and highlighting important trends.286 Instead,
under the Trump administration, during the pandemic, as complaint
volumes rose to historic levels, the CFPB left the work of analysis to inde-
pendent researchers and nonprofit advocacy organizations.287 Ignoring what
280. Id. (noting that consumers complained of waiting weeks to get cards needed to meet living
expenses). See also David Dayen & Bryce Covert, Government Contractors Nickle-and-Diming
Coronavirus Relief Recipients, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 14, 2020), https://perma.cc/SJ3M-TGV5.
281. 2020 CFPB Annual Report, supra note 270, at 17 (only payday loan companies were more
often untimely in their responses).
282. Treatment of Pandemic Relief Payments Under Regulation E and Application of the Compul-
sory Use Prohibition, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,217 (Apr. 27, 2020).
283. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Paves Way for Consumers to Receive
Economic Impact Payments Quicker (Apr. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/ULV4-FW8M (“The steps we are
taking today ensure that consumers can receive these payments in a fast, secure, and efficient manner.”).
284. I searched the “Research and Reports” section of the CFPB’s website, checking the box for
“consumer complaints” and providing a date range of 1/1/2020 through 1/1/2021. Research and Reports,
CFPB (last visited May 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/P7C2-9CZ3. The two reports are both short bulletins
identifying complaints that mention COVID-19 keywords. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, COMPLAINT
BULLETIN, COMPLAINTS MENTIONING CORONAVIRUS KEYWORDS (May 2020), https://perma.cc/KJ2G-
34Z5; COMPLAINT BULLETIN JULY 2020, supra note 276.
285. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(C) (2021).
286. A search of the CFPB’s “Research and Reports” section, with “consumer complaints” selected
and date range of 1/1/2017 through 1/1/2018 shows eight monthly complaint reports, ending with vol-
ume 26 in October 31, 2017, as well as the annual report and a “snapshot” of older consumers and
student loan debt. Research and Reports, CFPB (last visited May 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/RAA9-
Q87A.
287. See, e.g., Lisa L. Gill, Why the Pandemic May Be Hurting Your Credit Score, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Feb. 3, 2021), https://perma.cc/953K-AVTK; Letter from Syed Ejaz, Analyst, Financial Pol-
icy, Consumer Reports, to Michael Corbat, Chief Executive Officer, Citibank, N.A. (June 24, 2020),
https://perma.cc/5AMJ-QARV (detailing a review of complaints to the CFPB that found that Citibank
had more COVID-19 related complaints about credit cards than any other credit card company); Con-
sumer Complaints During COVID-19, STUDENT BORROWER PROTECTION CENTER, CONSUMER ACTION,
U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (Apr. 2020), https://perma.cc/S5EG-AZNG; Consumers in Peril: CFPB
Data Shows Consumer Problems in Year of COVID-19, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND (Mar. 2021), https:/
/perma.cc/7WS3-THCU; CFPB Complaints Surge During Pandemic, Led by Credit Report Complaints,
U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, (Aug. 2020), https://perma.cc/9F6T-WGKV; Consumer Complaints Break
Records: CFPB Must Take Powerful Action to Protect Consumers in Pandemic, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION
FUND (July 2020), https://perma.cc/77PW-YD2J; Analysis of CFPB Consumer Complaints March-April
45
Thompson: <em>PAY ATTENTION!</em>
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON203.txt unknown Seq: 46 30-SEP-21 16:19
388 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
was in the complaint data was costly to consumers and likely impeded the
effectiveness of the distribution of state and federal COVID relief money.
2. No Longer Data Driven
Just as the CFPB failed to leverage its complaint data to drive either its
own rulemaking or public policy, so too the CFPB left underutilized its
research capabilities during 2020. The CFPB had in its early days288 assem-
bled impressive research capabilities, including world-class researchers and
economists and specialized databases, including the Consumer Credit Panel
and National Mortgage Database. But the CFPB issued only two research
reports on the impact of COVID-19 on consumers’ use of and access to
credit during 2020,289 while JP Morgan Chase290 and the Philadelphia Fed-
eral Reserve Bank291 churned out regular status reports on the financial
health of consumers. Indeed, the CFPB even suspended multiple data col-
lections as part of its pandemic response.292
The CFPB’s regulatory response to COVID-19 seemed largely discon-
nected from data, whether from complaints, research, or its own enforce-
ment actions. Timing requirements for credit reporting corrections and
mortgage disclosures were relaxed as responsive to the crisis, never men-
tioning any data.293 The rules ensuring consent for electronic disclosures
2020, U.S. PIRG EDUCATION FUND, (May 2020), https://perma.cc/VX4J-FC9U; Yiwei Dou & Yongoh
Roh, Public Disclosure and Consumer Financial Protection (July 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/E4PS-
MG45; Christopher Bertsch, Isaiah Hull, Yingjie Qi, & Xin Zhang, Bank Misconduct and Online Lend-
ing, 116 J. OF BANKING AND FIN. (July 2020).
288. Cordray, supra note 197, at 90–91; McCoy, supra note 201, at 2579.
289. Special Issue Brief: The Early Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Consumer Credit, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 2020) https://perma.cc/V3GA-ZJPY; The Early Effects of the COVID-
19 Pandemic on Credit Applications, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/
PBN7-DXXV. To be fair, the CFPB did issue two monthly reports on its complaint data, including
complaints with COVID-19 “keywords.” The CFPB has also started the process for a survey of consum-
ers on how COVID-19 is impacting them. Scott Fulford & Marie Rush, Insights from the Making Ends
Meet Survey: CFPB Office of Research, Research Brief No. 2020-1, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 3
(July 2020), https://perma.cc/NVV5-MQXF; Agency Information Collection Activities: Comment Re-
quest, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,333 (Aug. 25, 2020) (notice seeking comment information collection in support
of Making Ends Meet survey geared to understanding the impacts of COVID-19 on consumers).
290. Research COVID-19, J.P. MORGAN CHASE (last viewed on May 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/
8WHB-SXC3.
291. Household Rent During COVID-19: Update for 2021, FED. RES. BANK PHILADELPHIA (last
viewed on May 19, 2021), https://perma.cc/AS45-G92Z.
292. CFPB Provides Flexibility During COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar.
26, 2020), https://perma.cc/8F34-6YFL. Even temporary freezes of data collection can impede the
CFPB’s ability to do core work. Cf. McCoy, supra note 201, at 2579–83 (describing the harm done by
Acting Director Mulvaney’s temporary freeze of data in early 2018).
293. Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and Regulation V in Light of the CARES Act, supra note 273 (relaxing timing requirements for investi-
gations of credit reporting disputes); Application of Certain Provisions in the TILA-RESPA Integrated
Disclosure Rule and Regulation Z Right of Rescission Rules in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 85
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related to credit cards, including the required account opening disclosures,
were relaxed,294 without noting that Wells Fargo,295 Bank of America,296
and Fifth Third297 had all been investigated by the CFPB for opening ac-
counts without consumer consent. The CFPB relaxed rules governing the
timing and accuracy of mortgage servicers’ communications with borrow-
ers having trouble making their mortgage payments298 while complaint data
showed historic numbers of borrowers complaining to the CFPB about ex-
actly that.299 And, although the CFPB’s own research showed that there
was no generalized demand during the early days of the crisis for an in-
crease in credit,300 the CFPB justified some deregulatory actions by saying
they would help consumers access credit faster.301
Fed. Reg. 26,319 (May 4, 2020) (relaxing timing requirements for mortgage disclosures, purportedly to
help support refinancing, despite earlier guidance); The Bureau’s Mortgage Servicing Rules FAQs re-
lated to the COVID-19 Emergency (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/S3XX-TT2G, allowing mortgage
servicers additional time to provide borrowers the payoff statements necessary for refinancing.
294. Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Electronic Credit Card Dis-
closures in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 3, 2020), https://
perma.cc/HFB2-ASQ4 (relaxing provisions ensuring consent to electronic disclosures in credit card ap-
plications).
295. Consent Order, In the Matter of: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2016-CFPB-0015 (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://perma.cc/89XX-ZDNP (consent order based on the finding that Wells Fargo had, among other
matters, submitted applications for credit cards without customers’ knowledge).
296. Decision and Order on Petition by Bank of America Corp. to Set Aside or Modify Civil Investi-
gative Demand, In Re Bank of Am. Corp., 2019-MISC-Bank of America Corp.-0001 (July 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/X2ZQ-URRV (order signed by Director Kraninger denying Bank of America petition to
modify or set aside Civil Investigative Demand on Bank of America sales and account opening prac-
tices); Kevin Wack, Ex-Bank of America Employees Allege ‘Extreme Pressure’ to Sell Credit Cards,
AM. BANKER (Aug. 27, 2020, 9:00 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/FD9X-BWXB.
297. Complaint, Bureau of Consumer Fin. Prot. v. Fifth Third Bank, N.A., 20-cv-01683 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 9, 2020), https://perma.cc/GH8M-YXV9 (alleging that Fifth Third Bank employees, since at least
2008, were opening credit card accounts without customers’ permission).
298. Joint Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Mortgage Servicing
Rules in Response to the COVID-19 Emergency and the CARES ACT, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU,
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP., NAT. CREDIT UNION
ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS (Apr. 3,
2020), https://perma.cc/Y5BW-BKBZ.
299. Kate Berry, CFPB Gets Earful from Consumers About Mortgage Servicers, AM. BANKER (May
10, 2020, 9:00 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/8GSX-U5TK.
300. Special Issue Brief: The Early Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Consumer Credit, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 2020) https://perma.cc/V3GA-ZJPY; The Early Effects of the COVID-
19 Pandemic on Credit Applications, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/
PBN7-DXXV.
301. See, e.g., Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Electronic Credit
Card Disclosures in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic (June 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/JVV4-ZF6Z
(relaxing provisions ensuring consent to electronic disclosures in credit card applications); Application
of Certain Provisions in the TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosure Rule and Regulation Z Right of Rescis-
sion Rules in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,319 (May 4, 2020) (relaxing timing
requirements for mortgage disclosures, purportedly to help support refinancing); Consumer Fin. Protec-
tion Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Issues Final Rule on Small Dollar Lending (July 7,
2020), https://perma.cc/64MA-LHUH (“[T]oday’s action will help to ensure the continued availability
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3. Rulemaking and Guidance During COVID-19
The CFPB’s first major independent action302 to address the
coronavirus was on March 26, 2020. On that day, it suspended reporting
and data collection under a number of different regulatory requirements,
including collections meant to provide empirical grounding for two new
congressionally-mandated rulemakings.303 This would prove to be the tem-
plate for the CFPB’s response to COVID-19 during 2020: using the pan-
demic to justify relaxing regulatory requirements on businesses with only
the thinnest evidentiary basis.304
of small dollar lending products for consumers who demand them, including those who may have a
particular need for such products as a result of the current pandemic.”).
302. Although the CFPB is an independent agency, Director Kraninger initially indicated that she
would take her lead in responding to the crisis from the Secretary of the Treasury. Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau Oversight Senate Hearing (Mar. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/267E-KDE3 at 31:15 to Senator
Tester.
303. CFPB Provides Flexibility During COVID-19 Pandemic, supra note 292. The two mandated
rulemakings were the small business lending data collection rulemaking, Section 1071 of the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. §1376 (2010),
codified at 15 U.S.C 1691c-2 (2010), and the PACE loans rulemaking, mandated by section 307 of the
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-174 (2018).
304. Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
and Regulation V in Light of the CARES Act, supra note 273 (relaxing timing requirements for investi-
gations of credit reporting disputes); Joint Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regard-
ing the Mortgage Servicing Rules in Response to the COVID-19 Emergency and the CARES Act, supra
note 298 (promises mortgage servicers, “until further notice,” that neither it nor any other federal or state
banking regulator will enforce the majority of loss mitigation rules put in place during the Great Reces-
sion to protect homeowners from facing foreclosure before being evaluated for loss mitigation options);
The Bureau’s Mortgage Servicing Rules FAQs related to the COVID-19 Emergency, supra note 293
(relaxing timing requirements to provide payoff statements; “Servicers can provide payoff notices in a
reasonable time rather than within 7 business days if they cannot provide it within 7 business days due to
the COVID-19 emergency.”); Bulletin 2020-02, Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance: Handling of
Information and Documents During Mortgage Servicing Transfers, 85 Fed. Reg. 25,281 (May 1, 2020)
(promising a light touch for problems impacting consumers resulting from poor mortgage servicing
transfer practices during the pandemic); Application of Certain Provisions in the TILA-RESPA Inte-
grated Disclosure Rule and Regulation Z Right of Rescission Rules in Light of the COVID-19 Pan-
demic, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,319 (May 4, 2020) (relaxing timing requirements for mortgage disclosures,
purportedly to help support refinancing, despite earlier guidance giving servicers more time to process
payoff notices necessary for refinancing); The Bureau’s Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B
FAQs related to the COVID-19 Emergency, CFPB (May 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/WX6P-XE2E (ad-
dressing lenders’ uncertainty about what constituted an application for a PPP loan under ECOA); State-
ment on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding Regulation Z Billing Error Resolution
Timeframes in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (May 13, 2020),
https://perma.cc/VTP7-C5FK (extending time to resolve billing error disputes, provided no negative
credit reporting or fees charged to the consumer); Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices
Regarding Electronic Credit Card Disclosures in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN.
PROT. BUREAU (June 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/K5E9-NBHT (relaxing provisions ensuring consent to
electronic disclosures in credit card applications). See also III.D.2, infra (discussing the lack of eviden-
tiary foundation for the CFPB’s COVID-19 response).
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For example, the CFPB waived price disclosures in a small part of the
remittance market for a few months305 while it finished a final rule perma-
nently removing those disclosure requirements.306 In doing so, it claimed
that the relaxation was related to COVID-19, without any apparent logical
or empirical support.307
More generally, as the CFPB acknowledged in a blog post, to the ex-
tent it was responding to the crisis, it intended to prioritize the recovery and
stability of the “financial sector.”308 The CFPB, along with other financial
regulators, promised that it would not take enforcement action for violation
of any consumer protection or fair lending rules, “provided that the circum-
stances were related to the National Emergency and that the institution
made good faith efforts to assist borrowers . . .”309 An otherwise laudable
supervisory guidance document on mortgage servicing transfers, promoting
sensible best practices to minimize consumer harm, and noting that the risks
of consumer harm were particularly elevated under existing market circum-
stances, nonetheless gave mortgage servicers a free pass during the pan-
demic.310 The CFPB stated that it would “consider the challenges that enti-
ties may face” for transfers during or within four months of the end of the
National Emergency.311 There was no meaningful countervailing considera-
tion of the challenges that millions of families were facing at that very mo-
ment312 or the risks that servicing transfers present to borrowers seeking
assistance from their mortgage servicer. 313
305. Statement on Supervisory and Enforcement Practices Regarding the Remittance Rule in Light
of the COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/
WY5TQLUT.
306. Remittance Transfers Under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (Regulation E), 85 Fed. Reg.
34,870 (June 5, 2020). See also Supervisory Highlights, Issue 22 (Summer 2020) 85 Fed. Reg. 55,828,
55,837 (explaining the statement as allowing a transition period to the final rule’s effective date of July
21, 2020).
307. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Announces Guidance on Remittance Transfers During
COVID-19 Pandemic, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Apr. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/M5D6-G4AT.
308. Susan M. Bernard, Spring 2020 Rulemaking Agenda, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (June 30,
2020), https://perma.cc/FM8Y-C2YH.
309. Interagency Statement on Loan Modifications & Reporting for Financial Institutions Working
with Customers Affected by the Coronavirus (Revised), BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP. NAT’L CREDIT UNION ADMIN., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU 5 (Apr. 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/9RTM-L6SZ.
310. Bulletin 2020-02, Compliance Bulletin and Policy Guidance: Handling of Information and Doc-
uments During Mortgage Servicing Transfers, 85 Fed. Reg. 25,281 (May 1, 2020).
311. Bulletin 2020-02, 85 Fed. Reg. at 25,281.
312. By May 2020, more than four million mortgages were in forbearance, with most of those mort-
gages entering forbearance in April 2020. Freddie Mac, Mortgage Forbearance and Performance during
the Early Months of the COVID-19 Pandemic (Feb. 8, 2021), https://perma.cc/7RUK-N65S.
313. The CFPB had found in examinations in fall of 2019, immediately before the pandemic, when
servicers’ systems were not strained by record numbers of forbearance requests, that servicers asked
borrowers to resubmit loss mitigation applications and failed to credit periodic payments when received.
Supervisory Highlights, Issue 22 (Summer 2020) 85 Fed. Reg. 55,828, 55,833 (Sept. 10, 2020).
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Some of the CFPB’s regulatory actions during 2020 seemed sensible
policy interventions addressed to the challenges of COVID-19. These ac-
tions, however, failed to go far enough in providing needed consumer pro-
tections. For example, the CFPB relaxed the rules limiting the circum-
stances that government benefits can be put on prepaid cards to speed ac-
cess to stimulus payments.314 But even in August, five months after the
CFPB had issued this directive, and months after most people had received
their stimulus payment checks in the mail, reports continued to circulate of
people struggling to access the funds on the government-issued prepaid
card.315 Concerns were raised regarding the fees, mandatory arbitration
clauses, and privacy.316 Another example of a rulemaking that, while help-
ful, nonetheless was insufficient, was the CFPB’s COVID-19 mortgage ser-
vicing rulemaking.317 It provided strong encouragement to mortgage ser-
vicers to avoid lump sum repayment requirements but failed to provide gen-
eral protection from foreclosure for homeowners exiting forbearance.318
IV. BUILD IT BACK BETTER
During the last three years, Acting Director Mulvaney’s abortive at-
tempt at renaming the CFPB319 and smaller, more insidious changes have
314. Press Release, supra note 283 (“‘The steps we are taking today ensure that consumers can
receive these payments in a fast, secure, and efficient manner.”); Treatment of Pandemic Relief Pay-
ments Under Regulation E and Application of the Compulsory Use Prohibition, 85 Fed. Reg. 23,217
(Apr. 27, 2020).
315. Dayen & Covert, supra note 280. Matthew Haag, To Reach a Single A.T.M., a Line of Unem-
ployed Stretches a Block, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2020, updated July 7, 2020), https://perma.cc/XN7M-
UVB3 (reporting that, “from dawn to dusk,” hundreds of people queue to access an A.T.M. with low
fees and high withdrawal limits in order to get unemployment benefits); see also 2020 CFPB Annual
Report, supra note 270, at 71 (reporting on surge of complaints to the CFPB about government benefits
prepaid cards, predominately complaints about delays of weeks in receiving them).
316. Senators Hassan, Brown, Reed Lead Colleagues in Calling for Answers Over Difficulties with
Stimulus Payments Issued as Debit Cards, JACK REED UNITED STATES SENATOR OF RHODE ISLAND (June
24, 2020), https://perma.cc/8WQS-WW9M; Dayen & Covert, supra note 280; Cf. Matthew Haag, To
Reach a Single A.T.M., a Line of Unemployed Stretches a Block, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2020, updated July
7, 2020), https://perma.cc/XN7M-UVB3.
317. Treatment of Certain COVID-19 Related Loss Mitigation Options Under the Real Estate Settle-
ment Procedures Act (RESPA) (Regulation X), 85 Fed. Reg. 39,055 (June 30, 2020).
318. See Comments to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Regarding Treatment of Certain
COVID-19 Related Loss Mitigation Options under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA),
Regulation X; Interim Final Rule Submitted By Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., et al., at 3 (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://perma.cc/LRR6-GWCW (“But the CFPB must ensure that servicers do not foreclose on borrow-
ers who need relief other than a deferral before evaluating them for a complete loss mitigation applica-
tion.”).
319. One of Acting Director Mulvaney’s first acts at the CFPB was to order a name change, from
“Consumer Financial Protection Bureau” to “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.” Introducing
Our New Bureau Seal, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Mar. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/WQ5AWC3W.
Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Shawn Boburg & Renae Merle, How Trump Appointees Curbed a Consumer
Protection Agency Loathed by the GOP, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2018, 2:16 PM MST) (that, while the
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blurred and obscured the CFPB’s statutory focus on consumer financial
protection. As we have seen, during the COVID-19 pandemic and the ac-
companying economic turmoil, the CFPB was largely absent, whether we
look at providing public data and analysis or significant regulatory interven-
tion on behalf of individuals. Could the missed opportunities of the CFPB’s
COVID-19 response been avoided?
A CFPB that centered the voices of marginalized communities, that
prioritized data gathering and market monitoring on the impact of financial
products on underserved communities, would have been better equipped to
respond in a timely and effective way to the COVID-19 pandemic. Such an
agency would also be better positioned to respond to future crises. Ground-
ing the consumer protection work in empiricism rather than ideology
reduces the risk of regulatory error and promises a more robust and resilient
agency in the future. Both the CFPB and advocates can and must contribute
to building the CFPB back better and centering the voices of the marginal-
ized in its work. The powerful Dodd-Frank mandate to date has been insuf-
ficient to sustain a focus on racial and economic equity for marginalized
communities. We can and must do better.
A. Center Consumers and Marginalized Communities
The CFPB has a unique accountability to consumers and particularly
to those vulnerable and marginalized consumers and communities whose
exploitation triggered the Great Recession only slightly more than a decade
ago.320 That central relationship should be acknowledged, highlighted, and
owned. That relationship is anchored in the statute and is the source of the
CFPB’s ultimate power and validity. Hearing the voices and perspectives of
marginalized communities will require active engagement. The potential
payoff is a stronger and more resilient framework for the work of the
CFPB.
decision was not official until March 22, four months into Mulvaney’s time at the CFPB, it had been an
early priority of his, delayed because of concerns that the press might think “we’re not making thought-
ful and coordinated decisions”). Director Kathleen “Kathy” Kraninger, who succeeded John Michael
“Mick” Mulvaney, reversed course on the name change, noting that people often go by nicknames
without any harm. Sylvan Lane, Warren Calls for Probe into Trump Name Change for Consumer Bu-
reau, THE HILL (Dec. 18, 2018), https://perma.cc/CN5V-W3RV. See also Letter from Sen. Elizabeth
Warren to Mark Bialek, Inspector General, Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve and the Consumer
Fin. Prot. Bureau (Dec. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/W6HU-SGGY (noting that the Census Bureau, Fan-
nie Mae, and Freddie Mac all go by nicknames).
320. See generally II.B., supra.
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1. Taking Marginalized Communities Seriously Means Listening to
Them
a. Consumer Complaints
Consumer complaints are central to the CFPB’s work. They are the
way the CFPB hears most consistently and most directly about the con-
sumer experience. And the CFPB has done surprisingly well in terms of
getting complaints from at least some marginalized communities.321 But the
CFPB has been inconsistent about how it integrates those complaints into
its work and not always transparent about how those complaints are re-
sponded to. More could be done to strengthen this vital function.322
Over the years, advocates and others have interrogated the adequacy of
the CFPB’s responses to consumer complaints and the extent to which
CFPB uses complaints in setting internal priorities.323 Recent research has
also raised questions about whether financial restitution skews to richer,
whiter complainants, as well as whether that bias was accelerated under the
Trump administration.324 Formal rules about how the CFPB uses complaint
data could be too inflexible to adjust to emerging trends in the complaint
data or new questions that emerge in rulemaking. But the CFPB could de-
cide to target certain areas for more individualized responses as an adjunct
to using complaint data to fuel supervision and enforcement and could pub-
lish and seek comment on the criteria for such targeting. Similarly, the
CFPB could provide additional clarity in its reports to Congress and in its
monthly reports on the complaint data about what use the CFPB is making
of the data. More generally, the CFPB complaint database is a rich source
321. See, e.g. Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall, & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early
Analysis of the CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343 (2013) (reporting
that areas with a greater Hispanic population have a higher rate of per capita complaints to the CFPB);
Devesh Raval, Which Communities Complain to Policymakers? Evidence from Consumer Sentinel at 5
(July 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/74UA-6QYP (finding that “heavily [B]lack areas have a 119% increase
in complaint rate relative to areas with few [Black residents]”).
322. See Letter from Advocacy for Principled Action in Gov’t, et al., to Kathleen L. Kraninger,
Director, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Aug. 11, 2020), https://perma.cc/J7JY-4TUD (discussing the
difficulty finding the narratives on the reorganized website). See also Putting Consumer First: The
Missing Voice in the CFPB’s Coronavirus Response, STUDENT BORROWER PROT. CTR., CONSUMER AC-
TION, U.S. PIRG EDUC. FUND (Apr. 2020), https://perma.cc/R9S8-CU4N (describing improvements
needed to the consumer complaint function in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, many of which the
report argues should be made permanent once adopted). See generally Porter, supra note 118, at 75–82
(discussing various rationales for consumer complaint functions and concluding, “A crisp and transpar-
ent articulation of its goals would . . . advance debate about what the CFPB should accomplish with its
complaint system”).
323. See, e.g., Letter from Allied Progress, et al., to Michael Mulvaney, Acting Director, CFPB, July
16, 2018, https://www.consumer-action.org/downloads/coalition/Complaint_RFI2_Group_Comment.
pdf.
324. Haendler & Heimer, supra note 209.
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of direct information about what consumers are experiencing and how those
experiences vary across the country. The CFPB should make maximum use
of this data source in identifying the diversity of experiences of consumers,
including how experiences vary across communities and within marginal-
ized communities in particular.
b. Consultation in Rulemaking
The CFPB must do more to build out its capacity to integrate the per-
spectives of marginalized communities into its rulemaking. This means us-
ing the CFPB’s consumer engagement function, the CAB, and special
populations offices to bring diverse voices from across the country into the
policymaking apparatus of the agency.
As the CFPB recognized early on, Dodd-Frank mandated “targeted
outreach to groups that face particular challenges.”325 What was less clear
was how and whether that outreach would or should influence policy setting
inside the agency. A mature agency will answer those questions.
Fundamentally, the CFPB must establish a consultation standard for
marginalized communities. Outreach is important and needed. Marginalized
communities are unlikely to submit comment letters or have hired lobbyists
to represent their interests. Advocacy groups can help fill that role, but they
are often outspent and outstaffed by lobbyists for financial institutions. Ad-
vocacy groups, too, can vary in the level of their engagement directly with
marginalized communities and their ability to translate the diverse perspec-
tives of marginalized communities into rulemakiing. The CFPB should
build out the organizations it engages with, to engage more deeply and con-
sistently with a wider range of groups, including more grass roots organiza-
tions. The CFPB could also explore how better to facilitate participation in
the rulemaking process by marginalized communities and representatives of
marginalized communities. That could include meeting facilitation designed
to encourage participation, for example. It could also include experimenta-
tion with other participatory models to solicit input from a wider range of
communities. Language access—translation services—and accessibility are
essential for facilitating meaningful engagement by a wider swath of under-
served and marginalized communities.
Once that outreach is effective, though, the next question is what the
agency does with it, and how that information and data is ultimately incor-
porated into the rulemaking process. Formalized input points for the CAB
could help bridge that divide, as could formal consultation during the
rulemaking process with the special populations offices. The CFPB could
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consider including an analysis of the impact of its rules on racial and eco-
nomic equity, for example, as a formal part of its analysis of the benefits
and costs of the rule.
Doing this work will take time and will require the development of
new skills and relationships. It will also have payoffs for the agency, con-
sumers, and the financial institutions who both serve and profit from
marginalized communities. Deep listening and engagement should result in
rules that have more precisely targeted interventions. More targeted inter-
ventions, as a general rule, are less costly for financial institutions to com-
ply with as well as more effective and responsive to the needs of the com-
munities impacted.
The CFPB’s 2020 advisory opinion policy is a pronounced step away
from an inclusive and consultative approach.326 Under the advisory opinion
program, the CFPB provides that it will issue interpretive rules. Issuing
interpretive rules is a standard function of administrative agencies. What
makes the CFPB’s program troubling is the functional exclusion of
marginalized communities from those empowered to request an advisory
opinion.
Only regulated entities, or those representing regulated entities,327 are
likely to be able to set forth “actual facts or a course of action that the
requestor (or third party) is engaged in, or considering engaging in,” as
required to make a request for an advisory opinion.328 There is no process
for input, either before or after, and no way to ensure that the concerns of
consumers, much less marginalized communities, are considered equally
with the desires of financial institutions. Absent some mechanism to include
consumers’ voices, the concerns of financial institutions will override those
of consumers. Marginalized communities, who by definition already strug-
gle to make their concerns heard in the regulatory process, will likely be
further excluded by such a one-sided process.329
c. The Consumer Advisory Board
The Consumer Advisory Board (CAB) has been through two reorgani-
zations since 2017. The statute requires that the Director “seek” members of
326. Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,987 (Dec. 3, 2020).
327. The policy provides that a law firm or trade association may submit a request for an advisory
opinion on behalf of an undisclosed third party. Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,987, 77,988
(Dec. 3, 2020).
328. Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,987, 77,988.
329. Moreover, the advisory opinions proposed are on their face not limited to obscure technical
matters with little practical impact on consumers and their rights. The policy contemplates that the
advisory opinions issued will provide regulated entities a safe harbor from the various federal consumer
financial protection statutes, thus effectively barring the courthouse door to consumers, without any
formal opportunity for their input. Advisory Opinions Policy, 85 Fed. Reg. 77,987, 77,988.
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the CAB that include experts in consumer protection, “fair lending and civil
rights,” “community development,” and “representatives of communities
that have been significantly impacted by higher-priced mortgage loans,” as
well as representatives of depository institutions that primarily serve under-
served communities.330 In order for the CAB to function as designed, it
needs a fairly large and stable membership so that these diverse areas of
experience and expertise are fairly represented. The reorganizations over
the last few years have reduced the ability of consumers and marginalized
communities to provide meaningful input to the CFPB.331
A director focused on hearing from representatives of all these groups,
and in particular marginalized communities, will want to increase both the
numbers of members, to ensure a robust representation, and the terms back
to the more standard three-year term for advisory boards.332 The longer
term makes it more likely that members of the CAB will find ways of en-
gaging effectively with the CFPB and be able to transmit institutional
knowledge to newer members. A longer term also provides more payoff on
the CFPB’s investment in CAB members.
2. Ask the Question: Embedding Race and Economic Equity
Consciousness in Policymaking
As Gale Cincotta noted decades ago, while advocating for the passage
of the CRA, “It wasn’t good enough to say we will hire minorities, you had
to put a program together and have disclosure to see how your program was
working.”333 It is the same with rulemaking. The CFPB must measure the
effectiveness of its rules, not just against costs to covered persons and con-
sumers generally, but the particularized impact on marginalized communi-
ties. This must be a critical step before entering onto an intervention and in
deciding among interventions, just as the CFPB asks about the impact on
rural communities, before it finalizes a rule.
Asking the question of how a proposed policy impacts marginalized
communities does not dictate a result. But, as with other forms of cost-
330. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2021).
331. Renae Merle, Mick Mulvaney Fires All 25 Members of Consumer Watchdog’s Advisory Board,
WASH. POST (June 6, 2018, 3:32 PM MDT), https://perma.cc/JCA9-K93Q (Mulvaney fires all CAB
members; CAB members were reportedly told that they could not re-apply for seats on the CAB);
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection Announces New Advisory Committee Members, CONSUMER
FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Sept. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/5B34-6ZQK (CAB shrunk from 25 members to 9
and terms reduced from three years to one year); Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Charter of the
Bureau’s Consumer Advisory Board (Mar. 19, 2019), https://perma.cc/SC5B-VKPM (current CAB char-
ter; membership is now “approximately ten” and terms are two years).
332. See discussion accompanying footnotes 185–189, supra.
333. Community Credit Needs: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong. 159 (1977) (statement of Gale Cincotta).
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benefit analysis, it guards against unintended consequences and corrects for
blind spots. It is time to stop relying on our good intentions and critically
examine the impact of our work.
a. Regulatory Priorities
The CFPB’s regulatory priorities must be examined to see if they
match the statutory focus on consumer protection and risks to marginalized
communities. Presumably a regulatory agenda that centers consumers rather
than financial institutions would focus on areas where there is identified
consumer harm, including denial of access to “fair, transparent, and com-
petitive” consumer financial products and services.334 Rather than removing
protections in favor of access, as the CFPB under Trump has done,335 it
would take up the hard, unfinished question of access to what. The CFPB
could return to Gail Cincotta’s original quest to leverage the power of capi-
tal to develop communities and enrich the marginalized as much as those
already centered and powerful. This is a challenge that has only gotten more
difficult in the years since the passage of the CRA and the many ground-
breaking titles of the Consumer Protection Act. Lending is no longer done
exclusively or even primarily by bricks-and-mortar institutions. Nor are all
or even most of an individual’s financial transactions handled by a deposi-
tory institution.  Payment processor applications like Venmo and Zelle are
one piece of the general unbundling of financial services. All of this can
make it more challenging to detect exclusion or define inclusion. Conse-
quently, we need the CFPB more than ever to use all of its tools, including
data collection, research, and market monitoring, as well as direct engage-
ment with marginalized communities, to understand the impact of financial
services and products on underserved communities.
b. Consumer Redress
For the CFPB to fulfill its statutory mandate to address risks to tradi-
tionally underserved communities, it must prioritize consumer redress.
Under the Trump administration, the CFPB stepped back from full con-
sumer redress in enforcement cases.336 Recent research has also raised
questions about whether the consumer complaint function resulted in
334. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010).
335. Helaine Olen, The CFPB Once Defended Consumers. Thanks to Trump, It Now Helps Compa-
nies Prey on Them Instead., WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2020, 11:35 AM MDT), https://perma.cc/
EK6FJYQW.
336. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON FIN. SERV., SETTLING FOR NOTHING: HOW KRANINGER’S
CFPB LEAVES CONSUMERS HIGH AND DRY, H.R. REP. 116TH CONG. at 15 (First Session) (Oct. 2019),
https://perma.cc/WU23-4UB2.
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greater monetary relief for complainants from whiter, higher-income neigh-
borhoods as compared to poorer communities and communities of color.337
One possible approach to provide greater consistency across adminis-
trations would be to seek comments on a rule setting forth the centrality of
redress in settlements or otherwise bind the agency to public standards re-
garding when redress is sought and when not. In any event, the CFPB
should look critically at who gets redress for what across supervision, en-
forcement, and consumer complaints.
c. Center a Research Agenda
As discussed above, the CFPB’s statutory research mandate is remark-
able.338 But beyond the annual publication of articles analyzing the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act data and the few statutorily mandated reports,
there is no regular, public cadence of research reports whereby the CFPB
commits itself publicly to the regular release of reports on its statutory re-
search agenda. Nor is there a requirement, as there is with rules, to publish a
plan for the coming year.339 Building out a public facing research agenda
could create accountability for fulfilling the mandated research agenda,
which would help to center the voices and experiences of marginalized
communities inside the CFPB.
3. Fostering Visibility: Why the Org Chart Matters
During the Trump administration, the CFPB’s organizational structure
was significantly rearranged. Four offices mandated in Dodd-Frank as ei-
ther “offices” or “units” disappeared from the recent CFPB’s organizational
chart under the Trump administration and were subsumed as suboffices,
housed in offices, housed in divisions:
• Community Affairs: “a unit whose functions shall include providing in-
formation, guidance, and technical assistance regarding the offering and
provision of consumer financial products or services to traditionally un-
derserved consumers and communities”340
• Financial Education: an office “responsible for developing and imple-
menting initiatives intended to educate and empower consumers”341
• Servicemember Affairs: a unit “responsible for developing and imple-
menting initiatives for service members and their families. . .”342
337. See Haendler & Heimer, supra note 209.
338. See II.B.3, II.C.2, supra.
339. The CFPB is not among the agencies required by the Foundations for Evidence-Based Poli-
cymaking Act, Pub. L. No. 115-435 (2019), to publish an annual Learning Agenda, which would serve
some of the same purposes.
340. 12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(2) (2021).
341. Id. § 5493(d).
342. Id. § 5493(e).
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• Office of Financial Protection for Older Americans: a unit instructed to
undertake “activities designed to facilitate the financial literacy [of se-
niors] on protection from unfair, deceptive and abusive practices
. . . .”343
All were housed, along with the office of students, as “program offices” in
the office of consumer education.344 Instead of a division of Consumer Edu-
cation and Engagement, all the offices bundled under the “consumer educa-
tion” rubric—students and service member affairs, community affairs, older
Americans, as well as financial education—reported up to a political ap-
pointee overseeing a division of Consumer Education and External Affairs.
As we can see with the sharp drop-off in fair lending cases under the
Trump administration,345 structure both reflects leadership priorities and fa-
cilitates certain outcomes. Placing the statutory offices and functional units
within new offices obscured their visibility. Statutory offices, however,
were created to ensure the visibility of special populations and traditionally
underserved consumers. Obscuring the statutory offices and functional units
on the organizational chart both reflects leadership de-emphasis on racial
and economic justice and further impedes the ability of those offices to do
their statutorily mandated work.
Reorganizations take time and energy. They deplete morale. People
struggle to remember the name of their office (or agency). Few like to have
their work patterns disrupted just for the sake of disruption. At the same
time, these reorganizations so fundamentally obscure the functions and op-
erations of the offices, to connect the CFPB to marginalized communities,
that a CFPB committed to re-centering those voices will have to re-consider
this organizational structure. At a minimum, marginalized communities
need to know from looking at the organizational chart which office is
tasked with outreach and who heads the office. That level of transparency is
a bare minimum for meaningful engagement with, and accountability to,
marginalized communities.
B. Reframe Advocacy
As Richard Cordray notes, regulatory advocacy is not like either litiga-
tion or legislative advocacy.346 Cordray confesses that, as a litigator, he
343. Id. § 5493(g).
344. Consumer Education and External Affairs, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (last visited August
30, 2020, at 12:41 PM EST), https://perma.cc/57Y2-D8HX. See also discussion accompanying notes
207-208, supra.
345. See III.B., supra.
346. Cordray, supra note 197, at 90–91. (“I was a lawyer . . . often relying on the impressions made
by narratives and stories. . . . For the lobbyists, this platform was not nearly as good as the one they have
in dealing with Congress to shape legislation.”).
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relied on instinct and stories.347 Facts were important, but it was a select
universe of them. And, Cordray notes, legislative lobbyists “have levers
such as financial contributions and political pressures on individual mem-
bers.”348 But good regulators care about data.349
Stories can humanize, but rule writers, bound by the constraints of
administrative law, the requirement that their work stand up to scrutiny as
reasoned and fact-based, need data. This institutional demand for hard,
quantitative data provides opportunities for advocates. That opportunity is
increased by the Administrative Procedure Act’s requirement that all sub-
stantive comments to a rule be considered. When an agency is presented
with a unique, fact-based comment, the agency is constrained to consider it.
And, even more, an individual rule writer is often eager to consider it be-
cause data helps rule writers solve problems and do their jobs.
For advocacy to be successful, it must meet policy makers where they
are, and credit them with good faith. Fundamentally, advocates should think
of their role as translating the lived experiences of the communities they
work with, represent, and belong to, into usable information for agencies.
When the individuals writing the rules at agencies recognize data in the
stories advocates tell, and the lived experiences of the communities they
represent, then rulemaking will of necessity acknowledge and address those
experiences. That data can and should inform every aspect of rulemaking,
from policy framing to placement of commas in regulatory text. Regulators
need the context for the story before they can recognize its importance.
Framing stories with that context—“How often does this happen?” “What is
the scale of the harm?” “How typical is this story with other exper-
iences?”—lets regulators see the data in the lived experiences. Naming the
harms flowing from regulatory action or inaction can make those harms
visible to regulators and provide urgency. Even when the individual harm is
not itself easily quantified, the scale of those harms often can be.
Advocates have a powerful moral calling to remind the CFPB of its
fundamental mission to center the voices of marginalized communities.
They can best do this by insistent particularity. What are the harms? Who
are the harmed? What does that harm look like? Those are questions that
regulators are charged to acknowledge. Asking those questions with regula-
tors as well as offering the evidence that exists can help regulators internal-
ize the perspectives of marginalized communities.
Regulators hear often of the concerns and impacts on regulated enti-
ties. Those concerns weigh in the decisionmaking, as regulators weigh what
the costs are. Even unfounded fears, for example, could potentially dry up
347. Id. at 90. (“I was a lawyer . . . used to operating on intuition . . .often relying on . . . stories.”).
348. Id. at 91.
349. Id. at 90–91.
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access to credit.350  Advocates have an obligation to make sure that regula-
tors hear the concerns of and impacts on marginalized communities with as
much force as regulators hear from regulated entities. Raising the profile of
marginalized communities can change how a regulator understands a prob-
lem, what solutions seem viable, and what realities are internalized. This
requires sustained engagement across administrations.
The faith-based advocacy that championed the payday lending rule
was extremely effective in keeping that rule on the CFPB’s agenda and a
priority of Director Cordray over many years. The constant interactions, the
direct recounting of the experiences of parishioners struggling with payday
loans and disabling debt loads, and the sheer variety and number of the
voices in the faith-based coalitions, all helped elevate those concerns and
center them. And yet, successful as this advocacy was, the rule was vulnera-
ble.
The rule was vulnerable because it took too long. The young CFPB
was an ambitious, energetic institution. It wanted to solve every problem—
and solve every problem the “right” way. But agencies need to be selective
in their priorities. Had the payday rule been finalized in 2015 and fully
implemented by the time of the 2016 election, for example, it would have
been much harder for a subsequent administration to roll it back. Finalizing
the payday rule in 2015 would likely have required a different rule,
though—one with a narrower scope or a more limited intervention.351
In the CFPB’s debt collection rulemaking, we again see a rule that
took too long. In part, that was because the rule tried to do everything.352
The places where advocates most wanted to see change, including coverage
of creditors collecting their own debts and meaningful substantive protec-
tions, were hard to execute against a background of no rule at all. Could the
CFPB have done a smaller rule with more meaningful interventions? Was it
necessary to create ab initio an entire regulatory framework or could the
350. For example, the CFPB provided institutions making a “qualified mortgage” a safe harbor from
any challenge by a borrower that the institution had failed to evaluate the borrower’s ability to repay, in
violation of the Dodd-Frank Act. In doing so, it relied on what it characterized as a largely baseless
“widespread fear” by financial liability of litigation. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Stan-
dards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 6408, 6533, 6505 (Jan. 30, 2013).
351. The payday rule, as a brand-new intervention in a largely unregulated market, required a more
extensive development of the administrative record, including research and market monitoring than an
intervention that built on top of existing interventions and administrative records. The payday rule also
required more de novo legal analysis than most rules, again, because it was a largely unregulated market
and because the CFPB was implementing its largely undeveloped authority to regulate unfair, deceptive,
and abusive practices in the consumer financial marketplace and not a more straightforward implemen-
tation of a specific statutory mandate.
352. The incentive to try to do everything at once was strong, as there had been no prior rulemaking
over the many decades of the FDCPA’s existence. The CFPB had a clean slate to work from and pent-up
demand for clarity from debt collectors as well as obvious consumer protection gaps.
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framework have been built up more incrementally? Looking back, it seems
that advocates and regulators may have talked past each other without un-
derstanding the other’s goals. In the absence of understanding clearly what
the CFPB thought it needed to do, and what the CFPB thought the limits on
its authority were, advocates found themselves in the fall of 2020 wonder-
ing if no debt collection rule would have been better than the final rule.
Advocates must make the lived experiences of marginalized communi-
ties salient and visceral to policy makers; advocates must also learn to rec-
ognize the limitations agencies operate under, whether political, legal, or
time, staff, or other resources. Advocates can best support policy makers at
agencies if the solutions they promote are matched to the limitations policy
makers experience themselves as operating under.  Advocates, with their
more direct knowledge of the experiences of marginalized communities,
may be better positioned than agencies to identify the key provisions of any
market intervention. In a world of limited resources, for advocates and
agencies, advocates owe it to the marginalized communities whose voices
they seek to elevate to exercise strategic focus.
C. Move Beyond Dodd-Frank
The argument in this article is grounded in the history and language of
Dodd-Frank. The language of Dodd-Frank, when read against the context in
which it was enacted, creates a clear direction for the CFPB to focus on
marginalized and vulnerable communities.353 Those communities are where
risks to the wider consumer market often first appear, and those communi-
ties suffer the most when risky products are left unaddressed. Moreover, as
became clear in the Great Recession, risks to marginalized communities can
metastasize to the global economy.
Yet Dodd-Frank is far from perfect. Its focus on marginalized commu-
nities operates in fits and starts. The picture is pointillistic rather than
sharply defined.354 Marginalized communities are called out in great speci-
ficity in the CAB,355 but not directly in the statutory purpose,356 for exam-
ple. The weight to be given to the risks to traditionally underserved commu-
nities is nowhere set out, even if the statute requires attention to those
risks.357
353. See generally II. B, supra.
354. See generally II. B. 3, supra.
355. 12 U.S.C. § 5494(b) (2021) (requiring “experts in . . . community development, fair lending,
and civil rights, . . . and representatives of depository institutions that primarily serve underserved com-
munities, and representatives of communities that have been significantly impacted by higher-priced
mortgage loans” as members of the Consumer Advisory Board).
356. Id. § 5511(a).
357. See, e.g., id. § 5512(c)(2)(E).
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One can debate whether the identified special populations offices in
the statute are the right choices for all time. Are service members and older
Americans marginalized in the same ways traditionally underserved com-
munities are? What happens if and when we bring traditionally underserved
communities into the mainstream of financial life? Do we no longer focus
on those communities? Should the CAB always contain representatives of
communities beset by a prevalence of higher-priced mortgage lending?358
How does the CFPB’s mandate to pay attention to small financial service
providers359 and lending to small businesses fit in?360 And what about the
requirement that the CFPB consider the impact of any rule on rural commu-
nities?361
As I have suggested throughout, Dodd-Frank has an uneasy twinning
of access and consumer protection. The CFPB is told to “ensure access” for
all consumers,362 but given no levers (other than deregulation) to do so.
Conversely, the agency is given authority to root out “abusive practices”363
but forbidden from imposing a usury cap,364 even though, for many, usuri-
ous interest is the definition of a per se abusive practice.365 Congress did
not, in Dodd-Frank, provide clear instruction on how to resolve these ten-
sions.
These tensions resolve or at least abate if we recognize Dodd-Frank’s
wellspring in the civil rights and economic rights organizing of the 1960s
and 1970s.366 In that context, we can see that access to consumer financial
products and services is not meant to be access to any financial product or
service, no matter how abusive or exploitative, but to financial products and
services that foster development and growth. Risks to that growth and de-
velopment are to be identified and addressed. Those communities and per-
sons most at risk, most historically excluded and traditionally underserved,
are to be given a place of preference in prioritization and decisionmaking,
in recognition of the long historical denial of their legitimate needs.
358. The CAB’s inclusion of “representatives of depository institutions that primarily serve under-
served communities” seems more plausibly a membership cohort for the long term. Id. § 5494(b)
(2010).
359. Only three agencies, the CFPB, the EPA, and the Occupational Safety and Hazards Administra-
tion, are currently required to follow the extra procedural steps of convening a panel of small businesses
prior to initiating a rulemaking. SBREFA, U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (last visited May 20,
2021), https://perma.cc/8ZTF-WSR3.
360. 12 U.S.C. § 1691c-2 (2010).
361. Id. § 5512 (b)(2)(A)(ii).
362. Id. § 5511(a) (identifying the CFPB’s purpose as “ensuring that all consumers have access”).
363. Id. § 5531(a).
364. Id. § 5517(o).
365. See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Payday Lending Rule Exposes the
Poor and Vulnerable to Predatory and Abusive Lending Practices, July 10, 2020, https://perma.cc/
MN8H-Z5V2.
366. See II.B.2, supra.
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If we are to take seriously the mandate of development and access for
traditionally underserved communities, we must start with race. This coun-
try was built on slavery and race-based exclusion.367 The financial system
has embedded in it systematic racial preferences.368 But race is not the only
basis of exclusion and underdevelopment, and we should all want and strive
toward a market that is truly free and that allows each of us to grow and
develop and prosper.369
We can see in Dodd-Frank repeated gestures at this broad vision. Ser-
vice members’ frequent moves and deployments can keep them from being
able to participate fully in the financial mainstream, while debt collection
for a service member is far more likely to result in life altering conse-
quences than for a civilian.370 Scammers are quick to exploit declining cog-
nitive abilities and reduced social networks where they appear among older
Americans.371 Digital literacy and access can also be challenging for some
older Americans, which can hamper their ability to navigate the consumer
financial marketplace and could become an even greater barrier to access as
use of technology in the provision of financial services continues to acceler-
ate. As we can see with the continuing debates about how to provide small
dollar mortgages,372 financial institutions will often struggle to find a cost-
and profit-effective way to provide access to needed capital to lower-in-
come people. Rural areas also often suffer from a lack of access to capital,
for a variety of reasons, including pockets of poverty, increased costs to
deliver certain financial products and services,373 and geographic disper-
367. E.g., Chinese Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No. 47-126.
368. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP (2017); DOROTHY A. BROWN, THE WHITENESS OF WEALTH: HOW THE TAX SYSTEM IM-
POVERISHES BLACK AMERICANS—AND HOW WE CAN FIX IT (2021); KEEANAGE-YAMAHTTA TAYLOR,
RACE FOR PROFIT: HOW BANKS AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY UNDERMINED BLACK HOMEOWNER-
SHIP (2019).
369. See generally HEATHER MCGHEE, THE SUM OF US: WHAT RACISM COSTS EVERYONE AND HOW
WE CAN PROSPER TOGETHER (2021).
370. See, e.g., Courtney-Rose Dantus, Servicemembers and debt collection: Sharing your stories
(Sept. 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/VLH2-QKHX (“[D]ebt collection attempts can cause an extra layer of
concern for active-duty servicemembers. We’ve received reports from military consumers that some
debt collectors threaten them with reporting the debt to their commanding officer, having their rank
reduced, or putting their security clearance up for review.”).
371. See, e.g., Lisa Weintraub Schifferle, Grandparent Scams in the Age of Coronavirus, FED.
TRADE COMM’N BLOG (Apr. 3, 2020), https://perma.cc/6NQ4-SVWS (describing the “grandparent”
scam where an older person receives a seemingly-frantic call from someone posing as a grandchild).
When I received such a call recently, after I told the caller I had no grandchildren, I was beseeched,
“Don’t you remember me, Grandma?”
372. See, e.g., Matthew Goldstein, Where a Little Mortgage Goes a Long Way, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2,
2020), https://perma.cc/4JGJ-LSR9.
373. For example, it can be harder in rural areas to appraise property, which can make rural mort-
gage lending slower and most costly. E.g., Letter from Carlos T. Perez, Vice President and Chief Credit
Officer for Single-Family, to All Fannie Mae Single-Family Sellers, Lender Letter LL-2014-02: Prop-
63
Thompson: <em>PAY ATTENTION!</em>
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2021
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\82-2\MON203.txt unknown Seq: 64 30-SEP-21 16:19
406 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 82
sion. Small business lending is another area where reports continue to sug-
gest both illegal discrimination and more straightforward problems with
making such lending pay.374 It can be harder to evaluate the financial
strength of a small business than a large business, requiring more time and
individualized attention, which translates into more cost and risk for a
lender.
Focusing on access as an enabler, rather than access for access’s sake
alone, could help make sense of the push-and-pull of the current statute.
The statute itself, in its insistence on access to “fair, transparent, and com-
petitive” markets for “all” recognizes that not all access is equal and not
everyone has equal access to begin with.375 Centering marginalized com-
munities and their needs and risks could give focus and coherence to the
work of the CFPB, without dictating a single policy path to do that. Cham-
pions of the free market have recognized the need to provide some entry-
level access, even if they have been reluctant to engage the forces of gov-
ernment in making that access available.376
Congress could perhaps clarify that this is its intention. Congress could
expand the CFPB’s authority to focus more squarely on development of and
access to capital for wealth-building. Congress could create authority for
the CFPB to provide incentives for the provision of access to wealth-build-
ing credit and responsible financial services, as a CRA regulator or admin-
istrator of the CDFI Fund, for example. Congress could allow the CFPB to
set usury caps, thus setting a clear line between “good” and “bad” credit.
Congress could even specifically define what it meant by “traditionally un-
derserved consumers and communities.”
But a functioning, focused CFPB is urgently needed now, as part of a
new administration working to confront the pandemic, the uneven eco-
nomic recovery, and the legacy of structural racism. In the presence of con-
gressional gridlock and partisan divides, CFPB leadership can and must act.
CFPB leadership could center the voices of marginalized communities, and
a goal of development-enabling access, to guide its work and provide a
strong foundation, for its work now and in the future. This work of neces-
sity is a work in progress. As market conditions evolve, and as the CFPB
learns more from data collection, research, and market monitoring, what it
means to center the voices of marginalized communities, and who is in
erty and Appraisal Requirements for Properties Located in Small Towns and Rural Areas (Mar. 25,
2014), https://perma.cc/W3JF-85LP.
374. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Minority Entrepreneurs Struggled to Get Small-Business Relief Loans,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/V859-WETG. See generally CFPB, Key dimensions of the
small business lending landscape (May 2017), https://perma.cc/9QEP-WZGG.
375. 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a) (2010).
376. See, e.g., Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, Taskforce on Federal Consumer Financial
Law Report, Volume II at 94 (Jan. 2021).
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those marginalized communities, will shift and evolve. Nonetheless, the
statute’s north star, and the agency’s, is the pursuit of hearing, and listening
to, the voices of those pushed to the margins, underserved and poorly
served by the financial system as it is.
V. CONCLUSION
When Congress created the CFPB, it was responding to the last great
economic crisis of this country. It recognized, both implicitly and explicitly,
that racial and economic inequity must be addressed and must be addressed
together. Its work was incomplete, as the work of legislation always is, and
required implementation. That implementation began but was never carried
fully through.
The CFPB’s mandate was centered in the communities laid to waste by
predatory lending and the toxic combination of no access to wealth-building
capital and too much access to extractive credit. The great promise of the
CFPB to those communities remains as yet unfulfilled. The need is more
urgent than ever as we confront the persistent economic impact of the
coronavirus pandemic and the demands for racial justice in our streets.
For the CFPB to do this great work, it must be clear about its inten-
tions and goals. It must be clear about who it serves and for what ends. It
must make sure that it is, in fact, paying attention to those individuals and
communities, historically marginalized, who were nonetheless raised up in
Dodd-Frank. Their voices and lives should inform the work of the CFPB at
every stage. When we learn to center the diverse experiences and perspec-
tives of those marginalized, we will be on our way to a society that is more
just and that affords all of us the opportunities for economic self-determina-
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